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ABSTRACT 
 
As humans we have a remarkable capacity to sacrifice for the future, and an equally 
remarkable capacity to shortchange it, leaving our future selves to pay the price.  The research in 
this dissertation suggests that sacrifice for the future (patience) may be governed by the same 
rules that govern sacrifice for others (altruism).  Studies found that (1) patience was positively 
correlated with altruism, and (2) patience was positively correlated with empathic accuracy, a 
measure that predicted altruism.  A third set of studies found that (3) a pervasive influence on 
altruism—group membership—also influenced patience.  Participants who expected to switch 
groups in the future felt less connected to their future selves and left more than twice as much 
unpleasant work to the future.  This research provides converging support for the hypothesis that 
common factors promote altruism and patience, suggesting that we may be able to draw on the 
decades of research studying kindness toward others to promote a little more kindness toward 
our future selves. 
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DO YOURSELF A FAVOR: 
PATIENCE AS INTERTEMPORAL ALTRUISM 
 We are the only animals who imagine things we can’t see (Dennett, 1996; Gilbert, 2006; 
Roberts, 2002; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007).  We don’t need a passport and a plane ticket to 
picture the Éiffel Tower, only a prefrontal cortex (Addis, Pan, Vu, Laiser, & Schacter, 2009; 
Buckner, Andrews-Hanna, & Schacter, 2008).  Our ability to simulate the not-here, not-now 
means that we can forecast what may happen in the future and experience a preview of what that 
future may feel like (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Breitner et al., 2001; Gilbert, 2006; Gilbert & 
Wilson, 2007; Kavanagh, Andrade, & May, 2005; Phelps et al., 2001).  We don’t have to spend a 
weekend painting our walls pink and orange before deciding whether we like them that way; we 
can picture the combination and wince right now.  
 Our unique capacity to imagine the future sets up our unique capacity to sacrifice for it.  
We are the only animals who, in situations our genes could never have foreseen, accept costs 
now for payoffs much later.  Other primates wait only a few minutes for a larger reward (Beran 
& Evans, 2009; Stevens, Hallinan, & Hauser, 2005).  Yet we routinely study to pass a test 
tomorrow, exercise to fit into a wedding dress in a few months, and save to retire to Hawaii in 
thirty years.   
 Despite our capacity to sacrifice for the future, we often foresee what will make us happy 
and fail to do it anyway.  It is just as human to party the night before a midterm, sleep in instead 
of hitting the gym, and buy a new convertible instead of saving—leaving our future selves to pay 
the price of failure, last-minute dress alterations, and a lackluster retirement.  Americans have 
saddled their future selves with more than $856 billion in credit card debt (Federal Reserve 
Aggregate Revolving Consumer Debt Survey, 2014), and although workers typically save 
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something for retirement, most don’t save enough (Bernheim et al., 2000; Li, 1996; Munnell, 
Webb, & Golub-Sass, 2007; Retirement Confidence Survey, 2013).   
 Our impatience is quantifiable: when people choose between receiving smaller amounts 
of money now and larger amounts in the future, they tend to choose smaller immediate rewards 
(called discounting future rewards; e.g. Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002; Kirby & 
Marakovic, 1996).  Further, the closer the delay period is to right now, the more it costs people to 
wait (e.g. people need to be paid a lot to wait a month, but not that much more to wait two 
months; Kirby & Marakovic, 1996; Laibson, 1997; Laibson, Repetto, & Tobacman, 1998; 
Zauberman, Kim, Maikoc, & Bettman, 2009).  This indicates that the impatience people display 
in these decisions cannot fully be explained by rational concerns that change linearly with time, 
such as the certainty of getting the reward (Kirby & Marakovic, 1996; Chapman, 1996; 
Frederick, Loewenstein, & O’Donoghue, 2002; Laibson, 1997; O’Donoghue & Rabin, 1999).  
Rather, this impatience reflects a tendency to shortchange the future in service of what happens 
now. 
Future Me Is More Like You 
Why do we so often prioritize the present over the future?  One possibility is that when 
we imagine something happening to us in the future, it feels like it’s happening to someone else 
(Parfit, 1971, 1984; Schelling, 1984).  We typically keep more for ourselves when dividing 
resources with other people (Camerer, 2003; Diekmann, Samuels, Ross, & Bazerman, 1997).  If 
the future self is another ‘other,’ we would also expect to keep more for our present selves when 
dividing resources with our future selves.   
New research confirms that we think about our future selves in much the same way that 
we think about other people.  When people imagine their future selves (but not their present 
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selves) they adopt the visual perspective of an external observer, rather than imagining events in 
the first person (Pronin & Ross, 2006).  People make the same decisions for their future selves as 
for others, which are distinct from the decisions they make for their present selves (Pronin, 
Olivola, & Kennedy, 2008).  They also make behavioral attributions for their future selves that 
are more like those that they make for others than those that they make for their present selves 
(Nussbaum, Trope, & Liberman, 2003; Pronin & Ross, 2006; Wakslak, Nussbaum, Liberman, & 
Trope, 2008).   
These behavioral results converge with research in cognitive neuroscience.  
Neuroimaging research has shown that cortical midline structures, including the mesial 
prefrontal cortex (mPFC) and the rostral anterior cingulate (rACC), are more active when people 
are thinking about themselves (‘Do I like hip hop?’) than when they are thinking about other 
people (‘Does Roy like hip-hop?') (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Craik et al., 1999; Heatherton et al., 
2006; Kelley et al., 2002; Moran, Macrae, Heatherton, Wyland, & Kelley, 2006; Northoff & 
Bermpohl, 2004; Northoff et al., 2006).  Likewise the vmPFC and rACC are more active when 
people are thinking about their present selves (‘Do I like hip hop?’) than when they are thinking 
about their future selves (‘Will I like hip hop?’; Ersner-Hershfield, Wimmer, & Knutson, 2009; 
Mitchell, Schirmer, Ames, & Gilbert, 2010).  The larger the difference in activation in these 
regions for present relative to future selves, the less willing people are to forego small benefits in 
the present ($1 today) to obtain larger benefits in the future ($5 next month).   
Common Factors Affect Helping Future Me and You 
If we think about our future selves in much the same way that we think about other 
people, the factors that influence sacrifice for others may also influence sacrifice for the future.  
Several studies support this possibility.   
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We tend to sacrifice more for others if we feel connected and similar to them (Aknin, 
Sandstrom, Dunn, & Norton, 2011; Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, 
Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Galak, Small, & Stephen, 2010; Krebs, 1975).  Likewise, people who 
feel more similar to their future selves have lower discount rates and more financial assets, 
including greater savings and lower debt (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009).  People also discount 
rewards more when the delay period for the reward is a period during which they expect to their 
identity to change (Bartels & Rips, 2010).  Further, telling college seniors that they will be very 
different after they graduate leads more of them to choose a small immediate reward instead of 
waiting a year for a larger one (Bartels & Urminsky, 2011).   
We also sacrifice more for others if we attend to specific individuals (e.g. Jenni & 
Loewenstein, 1997; Kogut & Ritov, 2005; Loewenstein, Small & Strand, 2006).  Likewise, 
people who interact with aged versions of themselves in virtual reality are more interested in 
saving for retirement than those who interact with current versions of themselves or aged 
versions of someone else (Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2011).   
Finally, a sense of social responsibility can promote sacrifice for others to whom we feel 
connected (Nadler, Romek, & Shapira-Friedman, 1979; Willis & Goethais, 1973).  Likewise, 
people who feel connected to their future selves save more for retirement if they see a message 
appealing to the social responsibility they have to their future selves than if they see a message 
appealing to their self-interest (Bryan & Hershfield, 2012).   
Patience as Intertemporal Altruism 
 In short, new research in psychology, behavioral economics, and cognitive neuroscience 
implies that (1) we regard our future selves as other people, and (2) our connection to our future 
selves influences how we make the decisions that will ultimately affect their well-being.  Taken 
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together, this research suggests that the basic rules that govern our treatment of others may 
govern our treatment of our future selves.  In other words, the same factors that influence 
sacrifice for others (altruism) may influence sacrifice for the future (patience). 
 This hypothesis suggests a new place to look for the causes of impatience.  Decades of 
research have shed light on the causes of our unkindness to others; if common factors promote 
altruism and patience, we may be able draw on this research to explain and ameliorate 
unkindness toward our future selves.  Specifically, we may be able to take factors that we know 
affect altruism, and find that they affect patience.   
The Present Research 
 This dissertation will test the hypothesis that common factors promote altruism and 
patience.  Studies will test whether (1) patience is positively correlated with altruism, and (2) 
patience is positively correlated with empathic accuracy, a factor that predicts altruism.  A third 
set of studies will test whether (3) a pervasive influence on altruism—group membership—also 
influences patience.   
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STUDY SET 1:  
IS PATIENCE CORRELATED WITH ALTRUISM? 
If common factors promote altruism and patience, we would expect patience to be 
positively correlated with altruism.  Studies 1a and 1b tested this hypothesis by asking 
participants to make two sets of hypothetical choices: (1) choices between receiving a smaller 
amount of money immediately or a larger amount after a delay (the measure of patience), and (2) 
choices between receiving a smaller amount of money immediately or giving a larger amount to 
another participant (the measure of altruism).  I predicted that the amount of money required to 
compel participants to wait for a larger payoff would be positively correlated with the amount of 
money required to compel them to give money to someone else—that those whose patience cost 
less would also put a lower price on altruism.   
Study 1a 
Participants 
 250 participants completed an online survey advertised in the ‘volunteers’ section of 
Craigslist.  67 were run by advertising on the Boston Craigslist website, 15 by advertising in 
Austin, 31 by advertising in San Francisco, 61 by advertising in Chicago, 48 by advertising in 
Philadelphia, and 28 by advertising in Atlanta.  Participants were at least 18 years of age; the 
survey did not ask for specific demographic information. 
Measures and Procedure 
 I measured participants’ patience and altruism through two sets of hypothetical decisions 
(in counterbalanced order).  To measure patience, I used a hypothetical version of a discounting 
task.  Specifically, I asked participants to imagine that they were in an experiment and were 
given two options: receiving a certain amount of money now, or receiving a certain amount of 
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money in the future (See Appendix A for instructions).  Participants then indicated which option 
they would choose in 26 different questions, with the current amount remaining constant, but the 
future amount increasing by $2 each question.  The measure of patience was the minimum 
amount of money required to compel participants to choose the future amount. 
To measure altruism, I designed an analogue of the patience questions.  This set of 
questions also asked participants to imagine that they were in an experiment, but this time they 
were to imagine that there was another participant in another room and that they had to choose 
between receiving a certain amount of money now, or asking the experimenter to give a certain 
amount to the other participant (see Appendix B for instructions).  Participants answered 26 
questions, with the current amount remaining constant, but the amount for the other participant 
going up by $2 for each decision.  The measure of altruism was the minimum amount of money 
required to compel participants to choose to give money to the other participant. 
 I collected responses from five different versions of this survey, altering the parameters 
of the questions slightly in different versions in an attempt to increase the percentage of 
participants who switched to the patient and altruistic response somewhere within the available 
range (if participants never switched from impatience to patience, I could not calculate a precise 
value for the cost of their patience, and likewise for altruism).  To maximize response rates, I 
posted each version of the survey in a different city.   
The first version of the survey asked participants to choose between receiving $5 now or 
$7+ in one month, and between receiving $5 now or giving $7+ to the next participant.  In the 
subsequent four surveys I made the following changes: (1) I made the delay for the patience 
questions one year instead of one month, (2) I made the first patience question a choice between 
receiving $5 immediately or receiving $5 in a month (instead of $7), and the first altruism 
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decision a choice between receiving $5 or giving $5 to the other participant (instead of $7), (3) I 
made the impatient amount $8 for the patience questions (instead of $5), and (4) I changed the 
participants’ amount to $2 for the altruism questions (instead of $5). 
Results  
I used meta-analysis to combine the results from the five survey versions (Lipsey & 
Wilson, 2001) because the N for most of the individual survey versions was quite low.  Meta-
analyzing the results across surveys, altruism and patience were positively correlated.  This 
correlation held both when I included just those participants (40%) who provided a cost for both 
patience and altruism by switching to the patient and altruistic decision somewhere within the 
available range, N = 94, r = .428, p < .01, and when I analyzed a larger percentage of the data 
(90%) by assigning reasonable values to those who did not switch (i.e. by assigning the first 
possible value to those who were altruistic or patient at the first opportunity and the last possible 
value to those who were never patient or were never altruistic), N = 225; r = .265, p < .01.  
(Analyses excluded the 25 participants who did not answer all of the altruism or patience 
questions.) 
Discussion 
Study1a found that patience was positively correlated with altruism; participants more 
willing to wait for their money were also more willing to give money away.  This is consistent 
with the hypothesis that common factors promote altruism and patience.  However, because the 
decisions were hypothetical it is plausible that patience and altruism were correlated because 
participants who wanted to appear to do the ‘right’ thing indicated that they would wait patiently 
to get more money and also give up money so that a larger benefit could go to another.  To help 
rule out this explanation, study 1b added a measure of how motivated participants are to present 
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themselves in a favorable light (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).  By using Amazon Mechanical 
Turk, study 1b was also able to replicate the results of study 1a using a single survey with more 
power. 
Study 1b 
Participants 
100 participants were recruited through Amazon Mechanical Turk.  Participation was 
limited to American workers who were at least 18 years of age (43% female; MAge = 38.25 
years, SDAge = 12.86 years, range: 21-70 years).   
Measures and Procedure 
 Participants answered the altruism and patience questions used in study 1a (order 
counterbalanced).  For patience, the choice was always between receiving $5 immediately or a 
certain amount in one month.  The delayed amount began at $5 and went up by $2 per question 
for a series of 26 questions to reach $55 dollars.   
For altruism, the choice was always between receiving $5 immediately or giving a certain 
amount to the other participant.  The amount for the other participant started at $5 and went up 
by $2 per question for a series of 26 questions to reach $55.   
 After answering these questions, participants completed the Marlowe-Crowne Social 
Desirability Scale.  This scale measures how motivated participants are to present themselves in 
a favorable light by asking a series of true or false questions for which the likely honest answer is 
socially undesirable (e.g. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble; 
Crowne & Marlowe, 1960).  (See Appendix C for the full scale.) Participants also completed a 
few demographic questions.    
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Results 
Patience and altruism.  As in study 1a, the measure of patience was the minimum 
amount of money required to compel participants to wait, and the measure of altruism was the 
minimum amount of money required to compel them to give money to the other participant.  
Patience was positively correlated with altruism, both when I included just those participants 
(46%) who provided a cost for both patience and altruism by switching to the patient and 
altruistic decision somewhere within the available range, N = 45, r = .519, p < .001, and when I 
analyzed a larger percentage of the data (97%) by assigning reasonable values to those who did 
not switch (i.e.by assigning the first possible value to those who were altruistic or patient at the 
first opportunity and the last possible value to those who were never patient or were never 
altruistic), N = 97, r = .205, p = .044.  (Analyses excluded the 3 participants who did not answer 
all of the altruism or patience questions.) 
 Social desirability.  Social desirability scores were not correlated with patience or 
altruism.  This held both when I included just participants who switched at some point to the 
patient and altruistic decision, patience r = -.058, p = .573; altruism r  = .182, p = .222, and when 
I analyzed a larger percentage of the data by assigning reasonable values to those who did not 
switch, patience r = -.037, p = .716; altruism r  = .095, p = .350.   
Discussion 
Study 1b replicated the positive correlation between patience and altruism found in study 
1a, and demonstrated that this correlation was independent of participants’ motivation to present 
themselves in a desirable light.   
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Discussion of Study Set 1 
Two studies found that participants who were more altruistic were also more patient.  
This correlation is consistent with the hypothesis that common factors promote altruism and 
patience.  For instance, participants who tend to feel more connected to others may have felt 
more motivated to forgo money in order to give more to another participant and to their future 
selves.   
 However, there are many alternative explanations.  One possibility is that people who are 
virtuous in one way tend to be virtuous in other ways.  Neither altruism nor patience was 
correlated with participants’ motivation to present themselves in a favorable light; however, 
people who are genuinely more patient may also be genuinely more altruistic, not because of a 
special connection between altruism and patience, but because virtues cluster together (e.g. due 
to commonalities in parenting and culture, values, genetics).  Research showing that altruism and 
patience are more correlated with one another than they are with other virtues, such as honesty, 
would help rule out this alternative.    
Additionally, these studies used very similar questions to measure patience and altruism.  
This helped remove other sources of variance, but it also increased the probability that spurious 
factors (e.g. a motivation to pick answers with larger numbers in them) would create a positive 
correlation.  Research using measures of patience and altruism that are more different from one 
another could rule out this alternative.1   
                                               
1 Although there are multiple reasons to predict a positive correlation between patience and 
altruism, there are also good reasons to predict a negative correlation.  Maximizing personal 
financial gain likely requires both the patience to wait now for greater returns later, and the 
selfishness to keep as much as possible for oneself.  Likewise, the more one gives away to others 
now, the less one has to enjoy later.  Thus, individual differences in how much people prioritize 
maximizing their own financial gain might have produced a negative correlation between 
altruism and patience if this had been a dominant influence on participants’ decisions.    
 12 
 
In light of these and other alternative explanations, studies 1a and 1b would make a 
stronger case in combination with other research suggesting that common factors promote 
altruism and patience.   
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STUDY SET 2:  
IS PATIENCE CORRELATED WITH EMPATHIC ACCURACY? 
Decades of research have shown that empathy increases altruism (e.g. Batson, 1990; 
Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Caprara, Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2012; Edele, Dziobek, & 
Isabel, 2013).  In turn, people feel more empathy for other people if they think about their mental 
states, including their emotional states (Batson et al., 1997).  If the factors that promote altruism 
promote patience, we may also expect those who think more about others’ emotional states to be 
more patient. 
A common measure that focuses on thinking about others’ emotional states is the 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Task (RMET), a test of empathic accuracy that asks respondents to 
guess people’s emotional states from pictures of their eye regions.  Although some research 
suggests that empathic accuracy increases kindness toward others (e.g. Simpson, Ickes, & 
Blackstone, 1995; Verhofstadt, Buysse, Ickes, Davis, & Devoldre, 2008), I could not locate any 
research that directly examined the relationship between RMET scores or other similar measures 
of empathic accuracy and altruism.  For this reason, study 2a established that empathic accuracy 
as measured by the RMET is positively correlated with altruism.  Studies 2b and 2c then tested 
whether patience is positively correlated with empathic accuracy.  In addition, study 2c added a 
measure of connection with one’s future self to test weather this measure would mediate the 
relationship between patience and empathic accuracy. 
Study 2a 
Participants 
300 participants (recruited from Amazon Mechanical Turk) completed this study 
(pretesting suggested that this study required a large sample size).  Participation was limited to 
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American workers who were at least 18 years of age (49% female, MAge = 36.16 years, SDAge = 
11.69 years, range: 20 to 75 years). 
Measures and Procedures 
This study measured empathic accuracy using the “Reading the Mind in the Eyes” Test (RMET).  
Originally developed by Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, and Robertson (1997), this test 
shows a series of 37 photos of people’s eye regions, all expressing different emotions, and 
participants choose the emotion that the picture is expressing out of four possible choices.  
Scores on the RMET are inversely correlated with scores on the Autism Spectrum Quotient 
(AQ), and convey subtle individual differences in social sensitivity (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001).  A higher score indicates higher empathic accuracy.  (See Appendix 
D.)   
 Participants completed the RMET and the measure of altruism used in studies 1a and 1b 
(order counterbalanced).  They also completed the Social Desirability Scale and answered a few 
demographic questions.   
Results 
 RMET scores and altruism.  Scores on the RMET were negatively correlated with the 
amount of money required to compel participants to be altruistic.  This correlation held both 
when I included just those participants (51%) who provided a cost for altruism by switching to 
the altruistic decision somewhere within the available range, N =152, r = -.233, p = .004, and 
when I analyzed a larger percentage of the data (92%) by assigning reasonable values to those 
who did not switch (i.e.by assigning the first possible value to those who were altruistic at the 
first opportunity and the last possible value to those who were never altruistic), N = 275, r = -
.117, p = .052.  (Analyses excluded the 25 participants who provided inconsistent answers to the 
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altruism questions.) Thus, participants with higher empathic accuracy scores were also more 
altruistic.    
 Social desirability.  Social desirability scores were positively correlated with RMET 
scores, N = 300, r = .150, p = .009.  Social desirability scores were also marginally negatively 
correlated with the amount of money required to compel participants to be altruistic when I 
included just those participants (51%) who switched to the altruistic decision, N = 153, r = -.147, 
p = .069, although not when I assigned reasonable values to those who did not switch, N = 275, r 
= .064, p = .293.  Thus, participants with higher social desirability scores had higher empathic 
accuracy and were marginally more altruistic. 
I entered RMET scores and social desirability scores into a regression model whose 
dependent variable was altruism.  The analysis revealed that both RMET scores, β = .234, p 
= .001, and social desirability scores, β = .170, p = .017, remained significant predictors of 
altruism, showing that RMET scores predicted altruism independent of social desirability scores.   
Discussion 
Study 2a found that empathic accuracy was positively correlated with altruism, 
independent of participants’ motivation to present themselves in a favorable light.  If the factors 
that promote altruism also promote patience, empathic accuracy should also predict participants’ 
patience.  Study 2b tested this hypothesis.   
Study 2b 
Participants 
96 Harvard undergraduates and summer school students participated in a lab study.  I 
excluded two participants for not following directions, six for being strongly suspicious of 
elements of the study, and three because they had noticeably limited English.  This left 85 
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participants for analysis (69% female, MAge = 19.82 years, SDAge = 2.45 years, range: 16 – 27 
years).  Participants were recruited through the Harvard Psychology Department and 
compensated with $5 or study pool credit.   
Measures and Procedure 
This study measured patience using a standard intertemporal choice task (a discounting 
task).  This task, like the measure of patience in studies 1a and 1b, measured participants’ 
preferences for smaller immediate compared to larger delayed rewards (task adapted from Kirby 
& Marakovic, 1996).  Participants made 48 hypothetical choices between a smaller immediate 
reward ($10) and a larger delayed reward (order of all questions randomized).  The larger reward 
values ranged from $12 to $26 in $2 increments, and the delay periods were 1, 7, 30, 60, 180, 
and 365 days.  (See Appendix E for intertemporal choice task instructions.) 
The measure of patience was the participant’s discount rate.  Discount rates were 
calculated using the following hyperbolic model (Kirby, Petry, & Bikel, 1999; Mazur, 1987; for 
more specific information on how to calculate discount rates, see Kirby, 2000): 
 
 
V  =     A___ 
      1+ kD 
 
 
In this model, V is the value of the immediate reward, A is the value of the delayed 
reward, D is the amount of delay (in days), and k is the discount rate.  The larger the discount 
rate, the more impatient participants’ choices were. 
Discount rates predict patience in multiple domains.  Alcoholics, cigarette smokers, 
heroin addicts, and other drug users have higher discount rates than control participants (Bickel 
& Johnson, 2003; Vuchinich & Simpson, 1998), and lower discount rates predict lower BMI and 
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risk for obesity, higher rates of exercise, and greater use of preventative health services (e.g. 
Bradford, 2010; Chabris et al., 2008; Ikeda, 2009; Weller, Cook, Avsar, & Cox, 2008).  
Researchers have found similar patterns in participants’ discount rates when using real rewards 
(Kirby, 1997; Kirby & Marakovic, 1996) and hypothetical rewards (Green, Fristoe, & Myerson, 
1994; Locey, Jones, & Rachlin, 2011).   
Participants completed the intertemporal choice task and the RMET at a computer in a 
lab room.2 They then completed the Social Desirability Scale and answered some demographic 
questions.   
Results  
Discount rates and RMET scores.  Discount rates were negatively correlated with 
RMET scores, N = 79, r = -.225, p = .046.   (Analyses excluded the 6 participants who did not 
answer all of the questions.) Thus, more patient participants had higher empathic accuracy. 
Response times.  Response times for the discounting task and the RMET were positively 
correlated, N = 64, r = .562, p < .001.  (Due to a computer error RMET response times were not 
collected for 16 participants.) However, discount rates were not correlated with response times 
on the discounting task, N = 84, r = -.021, p = .852, and RMET scores were not correlated with 
response times on the RMET, N = 64, r = -.014, p = .915.  Likewise, discount rates were not 
correlated with response time on the RMET, N = 63, r = -.055, p = .671, and RMET scores were 
not correlated with response times on the discounting task, N = 80, r = -.060, p = .596.  Thus, the 
                                               
2 The measures in this study were included with a separate study that had a separate hypothesis.  
As a result, after completing the intertemporal choice task, but before completing the discounting 
task, participants had two other experiences.  First, participants encountered a confederate posing 
as a student who asked participants to answer as many questions on a questionnaire as they were 
willing to complete.  Second, participants had their height measured.  After this, participants 
returned to the lab room where they had previously completed the intertemporal choice task and 
completed the RMET.   
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correlation between RMET scores and discounting scores was independent of the amount of time 
participants spent on these tasks.   
Social desirability.  Social desirability scores did not correlate with discount rates, N = 
83, r = .012, p = .916, or RMET scores, N = 81, r = -.096 p = .394.  Thus, participants’ discount 
rates and RMET scores were independent of their social desirability scores.    
Discussion 
Study 2b found that patience was positively correlated with empathic accuracy, a 
measure that predicted altruism in study 2a.  These results are consistent with the hypothesis that 
common factors promote altruism and patience.  Our future selves do not provide us with literal 
facial expressions to decipher like those on the RMET, but higher empathic accuracy may reflect 
a more general tendency to think about others’ emotional states (Baron-Cohen, Wheelwright, 
Hill, Raste, & Plumb, 2001).  Those who tend to think more about others’ emotional states may 
be more engaged during a test of empathic accuracy, or get more practice reading other people’s 
emotions in everyday life.  In turn, the tendency to think about others’ emotional states may lead 
people to think more about their future selves’ emotional states, increasing patience.     
 When people think more about their future selves’ emotional states they may 
consequently feel more connected to their future selves.  Given that people who feel more 
connected to their future selves are more patient (Bartels & Rips, 2010; Bartels & Urminsky, 
2011; Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009), empathic accuracy may increase patience in part by 
increasing people’s connection to their future selves.   
Study 2c tested this hypothesis by including a measure of participants’ connection to their 
future selves.  This study also added a measure of mood to test whether participants’ mood could 
explain the correlation between patience and empathic accuracy.   
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Study 2c 
Participants 
114 Harvard undergraduates and community members participated in a lab study.  Eight 
participants were excluded for failing to follow directions, and an additional eight for figuring 
out the study’s hypothesis.  This left 98 participants for analysis (48% females, MAge = 27.88 
years, SDAge = 13.20 years, range: 17 – 65 years).  Participants were recruited through the 
Harvard Psychology Department and the Decision Science Laboratory, and compensated with $5 
or study pool credit.   
Measures and Procedure 
Participants completed the RMET, intertemporal choice task, and Social Desirability 
Scale from study 2b.  They also completed two additional scales.   
The first was the Future Self Connection Questionnaire, which I created to measure how 
connected participants felt with their future selves.  For the first 10 questions, participants 
imagined themselves ten years in the future and rated how similar and connected they felt to this 
future self.  I averaged these ten questions to obtain a connection score (α = .773).  For the 
remaining six questions, participants imagined developing chronic back pain in ten years.  Five 
questions then asked participants to rate how much compassion and sympathy they felt towards 
this future self with back pain, and I averaged these five questions into a compassion score (α 
= .914).  An additional back pain concern score question asked participants to rate the extent to 
which they were concerned about the possibly of developing back pain in the future.  (See 
Appendix F for the questionnaire.) 
 Participants also completed the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS), a 
widely used measure of mood with high internal consistency, and high discriminate and 
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convergent validity (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988).  Participants rated the extent to which 
they were experiencing each of sixteen specific mood states at the current moment (I shortened 
the original 20-item PANAS to the 16 most useful items).  I averaged the ratings for the ten 
positive items to calculate participants’ positive affect score (α = .909), and averaged the ratings 
for the six negative items to calculate participants’ negative affect score (α = .839).  (See 
Appendix G for the full scale used in this study.) 
 Participants completed all questionnaires and then answered some demographic 
questions.3 
Results 
 Discount rates and RMET scores.  Discount rates were negatively correlated with 
RMET scores, N = 97, r = -.354, p < .001, demonstrating that participants with higher empathic 
accuracy were also more patient.  (Analysis excluded the 1 participant who did not answer all of 
the discounting questions.) 
 Future self connection.  Participants’ connection to their future selves was negatively 
correlated with their discount rates, N = 97, r = -.236, p = .020, and positively correlated with 
their RMET scores, N = 98, r = .265, p = .008.  Thus, the more connection participants felt with 
their future selves, the higher their patience and empathic accuracy (see Table 1 for the 
correlations between these variables).   
 Participants’ compassion for a hypothetic future self who developed back pain was not 
correlated with their discount rates, N = 97, r = -.004, p = .971, or their RMET scores, N = 98, r 
                                               
3 The measures in this study were included with a separate study that had a separate hypothesis.  
As a result, before completing any of the measures in this study participants first summarized a 
paragraph that contained either an example of altruism or an example of honesty.  This 
manipulation had no effect on discounting scores, RMET scores, or, in a separate study, on 
altruism.   
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= .069, p = .499.  Likewise, participants’ concern about developing back pain was not correlated 
with their discount rates, N = 98, r = .059, p = .567, or their RMET scores, N = 98, r = -.158, p 
= .121 
 
Table 1.  Correlations in study 2c between discount rates, RMET scores, and future self (FS) 
connection scores.  Lower discount rates reflect higher patience.   
  
Discount Rates 
 
RMET Scores 
 
FS Connection 
 
Discount Rates 
 
__ 
 
-.354** 
 
-.236* 
 
RMET Scores 
 
__ 
 
__ 
 
.265** 
 
FS Connection 
 
__ 
 
__ 
 
__ 
* p < .05; ** p < .01 
 
Future self connection mediated the relationship between RMET scores and 
discount rates.  I predicted that participants’ connection to their future selves would partially 
mediate the relationship between empathic accuracy and patience.  Conceptually consistent with 
this, (a) RMET scores predicted discount rates, (b) RMET scores predicted future self connection 
scores, and (c) future self connection scores predicted discount rates.   
 The Sobel test is the most commonly used means of testing the significance of a 
mediation analysis (Sobel, 1982).  However, the Sobel test has recently been called into question 
because it requires the assumption that the sampling distribution of the mediation effect is 
normal, when in fact it tends to be asymmetric, with nonzero skewness and kurtosis (Bollen & 
Stine, 1990; Stone & Sobel, 1990).  As an alternative, bootstrapping approaches are becoming 
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increasingly popular, both because they are nonparametric tests that do not assume normality, 
and because they tend to have the highest power and the best Type I error control (Hayes, 2009).  
Bootstrapping generates an empirical representation of the sampling distribution of the mediation 
effect by taking repeated subsamples from the data (with replacement) and treating each 
subsample as a representation of the population in miniature. 
I used the Preacher and Hayes bootstrapping method (Hayes, 2013) to test whether future 
self connection scores significantly mediated the relationship between RMET scores and 
discount rates (using the PROCESS SPSS Macro that Hayes made publically available).  This 
method provides a 95% confidence interval (CI) for the mediation effect, which was significant, 
95% CI [-1.63, -0.50]. 
RMET scores mediated the relationship between future self connection and discount 
rates.  When I entered future self connection scores and RMET scores into a regression model 
whose dependent variable was discount rates, I noticed that RMET scores (β = -.314) remained a 
stronger predictor of discount rates than future self connection scores (β = -.153).  For this 
reason, I tested the hypothesis that empathic accuracy partially mediated the relationship 
between participants’ connection with their future selves and their discount rates.  A 
bootstrapping analysis (Hayes, 2013) revealed that the mediation effect was significant, 95% CI 
[-1.63, -0.50].   
Social desirability.  Social desirability scores were not correlated with RMET scores, N 
= 98, r = -.079, p = .439, discount rates, N = 97, r = .125, p = .224, future self connection scores, 
N = 98, r = .100, p = .327, future self compassion scores, N = 98, r = .010, p = .922, or concern 
about developing back pain, N = 98, r = -.112, p = .271. 
Mood.  Participants’ negative affect scores were negatively correlated with their RMET 
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scores, N = 98, r = -.331, p = .001, and future self connection scores, N = 98, r = -.200, p = .044.  
Positive affect scores were not correlated with RMET scores, N = 98, r = -0.31, p = .763, but 
were positively correlated with future self connection scores, N = 98, r = .299, p = .003.  Neither 
negative affect scores, N = 97, r = .159, p = .121, nor positive affect scores, N = 97, r = -.036, p 
= .729, were correlated with discount rates.   
 I entered RMET scores, negative affect scores, and positive affect scores into a regression 
model whose dependent variable was discount rates.  Analyses revealed that RMET scores 
remained a significant predictor of discount rates, β = -.340, p = .001, whereas negative affect 
scores, β = .049, p = .637, and positive affect scores, β = -.049, p = .612, did not.   
 I also entered future self connection scores, negative affect scores, and positive affect 
scores into a regression model whose dependent variable was discount rates.  Analyses revealed 
that future self connection scores remained a significant predictor of discount rates, β = -.220, p 
= .044, whereas negative affect scores, β = .113, p = .276, and positive affect scores, β = .023, p 
= .829, did not.   
 Finally, I entered future self connection scores, negative affect scores, and positive affect 
scores into a regression model whose dependent variable was RMET scores.  Analyses revealed 
that future self connection scores remained a significant predictor of RMET scores, β = .234, p 
= .024, as did negative affect scores, β = -.280, p = .005, but not positive affect scores, β = -.088, 
p = .379.     
 Thus, participants who were in a better mood had higher empathic accuracy and felt more 
connected with their future selves, but mood did not relate to patience and could not account for 
the relationship between patience and empathic accuracy, the relationship between patience and 
participants’ connection with their future selves, or the relationship between empathic accuracy 
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and participants’ connection with their future selves.   
Discussion 
Study 2c replicated the positive correlation between empathic accuracy and patience 
shown in study 2b, and demonstrated that this correlation was independent of participants’ mood.  
In addition, participants’ connection with their future selves partially mediated the relationship 
between empathic accuracy and patience, and empathic accuracy partially mediated the 
relationship between participants’ connection with their future selves and patience. 
Discussion of Study Set 2 
The results of these studies supported the hypothesis that common factors promote 
altruism and patience.  Participants who had higher empathic accuracy were more altruistic and 
more patient, and empathic accuracy and patience were both positively correlated with 
participants’ connection to their future selves.  This joins past research (Bartels & Rips, 2010; 
Bartels & Urminsky, 2011; Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009) to provide converging evidence that 
people are more patient when they feel more connected to their future selves.  It also 
demonstrates a novel relationship between attunement to others’ emotions and connection to 
one’s future selves.   
Empathic Accuracy May Promote Altruism and Patience 
 Higher empathic accuracy may reflect a greater tendency to think about the emotional 
states of others, including one’s future selves.  People who tend to think more about their future 
selves’ emotional states may be more patient when making intertemporal decisions because they 
think more about how they will feel if they receive money in the future.  They may also develop 
a habit of prioritizing the future because they often consider how their future selves will feel.     
People who think more about their future selves’ emotional states may consequently feel 
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more connected to their future selves, which may encourage them to be more patient (i.e. 
thinking more about their future selves’ emotional states  greater connection to their future 
selves  greater patience).  Consistent with this possibility, study 2c found that participants’ 
connection to their future selves partially mediated the relationship between empathic accuracy 
and patience.   
In addition, participants who feel more connected to their future selves may consequently 
think more about their future selves’ emotional states, which may encourage them to be more 
patient (i.e. greater connection to their future selves  thinking more about their future selves’ 
emotional states  greater patience).  Consistent with this possibility, study 2c also found that 
empathic accuracy partially mediated the relationship between participants’ connection to their 
future selves and patience.   
Alternative Explanations 
Mediation analyses do not reveal anything definitive about causal relationships.  
Additional measures helped to rule out some of the more obvious and uninteresting explanations 
for the correlation between patience and empathic accuracy: the time participants spent on the 
tasks, their mood, and their motivation to present themselves in a favorable light.  However, 
other alternatives remain.  For instance, patience and empathic accuracy could be correlated 
because all virtues tend to be correlated (as discussed for patience and altruism).  Alternatively, 
impatience may decrease people’s tendency to develop empathic skills.  The payoffs associated 
with thinking about other people’s emotions may be fairly long-term (e.g. building strong 
relationships, developing the ability to handle social situations); perhaps impatient people put 
less energy into developing these skills.    
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 Given the alternative explanations that confound correlations, I turned to experiments.  
Specifically, I manipulated a pervasive determinant of altruism, and tested its effect on patience.    
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STUDY SET 3: 
DOES GROUP MEMBERSHIP AFFECT PATIENCE? 
One of the most pervasive determinants of altruism is group membership.  Children and 
adults across cultures are kinder to members of their in-groups than to members of their out-
groups.  Merely categorizing people into arbitrary groups causes them to express more favorable 
evaluations of in-group members (e.g. Doise et al., 1972; Rabbie & Horowitz, 1969), allocate 
more resources to in-group members (e.g. Hertel & Kerr, 2001; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 
1992; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), cooperate more 
with in-group members (e.g. Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Simpson, 2006), and sacrifice more 
money for in-group members (Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008).  When placed in competitive groups, 
people favor in-group members even more strongly (Sherif et.  al., 1962; Blake & Mouton, 
1962), empathizing less with out-group members and taking pleasure in their misfortunes (e.g. 
Cikara, Botvinik, & Fiske, 2011; Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011). 
The strength and robustness of in-group favoritism makes it a promising test case for the 
hypothesis that common factors promote altruism and patience.  If this hypothesis is correct, 
participants should be less patient when they expect their future selves to be members of a 
different group.   
 Two studies tested this hypothesis.  Participants in these studies were randomly assigned 
to a team arguing for one of two positions in a legal dispute.  After reading about and discussing 
the dispute, half learned that they would switch teams and argue for the opposing position when 
they returned in a week for the second part of the study.  Participants then decided how much of 
an unpleasant task they would complete immediately and how much they would leave to 
complete when they returned.    
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I predicted that participants who expected to switch teams would leave more of the 
unpleasant task to the second part of the study than participants who expected to remain on the 
same team.  I also predicted that participants who expected to switch teams would feel less 
connected to their future selves, and that this would partially mediate the effect of switching 
teams on the amount of the unpleasant task that they left. 
Study 3a 
Participants 
 53 undergraduates from Harvard University were recruited through the Harvard Study 
Pool.  One participant was omitted for not finishing the study, one for having a large number 
of suspicions about the purpose of the study, and one for being confused about the study 
instructions.  This left 50 participants for analysis (66% female; MAge  = 19.92 years; SDAge = 
1.69; range: 18-25 years).  (2 participants did not list their age.) Participation took two hours, 
divided into two parts, and participants were compensated with $20 or course credit at the end of 
the second part. 
Measures and Procedure 
Harvard undergraduates arrived at the laboratory for a two-part study in which the two 
sessions were to be separated by about a week.  Throughout both sessions, the experimenter read 
from a script to standardize the procedure (see Appendix H).    
Session 1.  During session 1, participants read about a complex legal dispute between a 
biological mother and an adoptive mother who were both seeking custody of the same infant (a 
fictional dispute created for this experiment; see Appendix I).  Participants were told that there 
were several other participants in the lab that day, and that all of them had been assigned to one 
of two ‘legal teams,’ either the prosecution or the defense.  Each team, they were told, would act 
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as an advocate for one of the mothers.  During session 1 the teams would develop arguments on 
a particular mother’s behalf, and during session 2 the teams would have a debate.   
Participants were also told that during session 1 they would join their two other 
teammates in a chat room and spend about 30 minutes discussing the facts of the case and 
developing their arguments.  In reality, there were no other participants in the lab; to camouflage 
this, participants were told that the other participants had arrived at slightly different times to 
avoid face-to-face communication that could bias the online conversation. 
Once participants finished reading the case materials, they began the online chat with 
their two fictional teammates using Google Chat (gchat).  The experimenter sat in a separate 
room and played the role of the two fictional teammates by using two separate email accounts.  
The two fictional teammates and the real participant answered preset questions in a set order, 
with the real participant always responding last so that he or she would always see the same text 
from the other teammates.  (See Appendix J for gchat scripts.)  
After the chat was complete, participants were told that the first part of the study was 
finished.  Critically, participants in the stay condition were told that when they returned for the 
debate the following week they would remain on the same team, whereas participants in the 
switch condition were told that, due to some cancelations, when they returned in a week they 
would switch teams and debate for the opposite side of the case, against their teammates from 
the first session.  Before completing any other tasks, participants completed the PANAS to 
capture the mood that they were in after being told whether or not they were going to switch 
teams. 
Participants were then told that they would spend the remaining 40 minutes of the time 
slot participating in an unrelated study about pattern recognition.  For this study they were asked 
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to complete eleven pages of an incredibly dull and time consuming task (the unpleasant task) 
that required them to find four-letter animal names in lines of letters (see Appendix K).  Before 
beginning the unpleasant task, participants completed a few practice questions so that they would 
have the opportunity to discover how truly tedious it was.  They then received a folder 
containing the full eleven pages and were asked to decide how much of the task they wanted to 
complete right then, and how much they wanted to leave to complete when they returned for the 
second session.  Participants were told that there was enough time in both sessions to allow them 
to divide the task any way they wished (including doing all of the task in the first session or 
leaving all of the task to the second session).  To avoid demand effects, the experimenter left the 
room while participants divided the task.   
Once participants had divided the unpleasant task, they worked on the pages that they had 
decided to complete during the first session.  About five minutes before the study was scheduled 
to finish, participants filled out a questionnaire that asked them about the legal dispute and 
debate, the unpleasant task, and their feelings toward their future selves in a week (e.g. How 
connected do you feel to yourself a week from now; see Appendix L).   
 Session 2.  It was important to verify that participants expected to return for the second 
session and complete the pages that they had left for that time.  However, I did not need to 
collect any more data during session 2.  Thus, when participants returned for the second session 
they were informed that the study was complete, debriefed, and paid or credited. 
Results 
 Manipulation checks.  Participants assigned to the prosecution and those assigned to the 
defense were equally invested in their teams.  Prosecution and defense participants were equally 
invested in winning the case, t(48) = 0.85, p = .400 (prosecution M = 4.68, SD = 1.22; defense M 
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= 4.36, SD = 1.44), were equally convinced that the team they had been on in session 1 had the 
more valid case, t(48) = -0.61, p = .547 (prosecution M = 4.84, SD = 1.57; defense M = 5.12, SD 
= 1.69), felt equally competitive with the other team, t(48) = 1.12, p = .269 (prosecution M = 
4.52, SD = 1.42; defense M = 4.72, SD = 1.65), were equally confident that their team would win 
the debate in session 2, t(48) = -0.67, p = .507 (prosecution M = 4.92, SD = 1.12; defense M = 
5.16, SD = 1.41), liked their teammates from session 1 equally, t(48) = 0.77, p = .445 
(prosecution M = 5.80, SD = 1.12; defense M = 5.56, SD = 1.08), and felt equally connected to 
their teammates, t(48) = 1.39, p = .171 (prosecution M = 5.08, SD = 1.58; defense M = 4.48, SD 
= 1.48).   
 I collapsed across assignment to the prosecution or defense to look at the effect of 
switching teams.  Participants in the switch condition (M = 4.72, SD = 1.28) were less confident 
than were participants in the stay condition (M = 5.36, SD = 1.19) that their position from session 
1 was the valid case (t(48) = 2.07, p = .044), but participants in the switch condition (M = 4.72, 
SD = 5.36) also felt marginally less confident than did participants in the stay condition (M = 
5.36, SD = 4.72) that they would win the debate in session 2 (t(48) = 1.84, p = .072).   
Participants in the switch and stay conditions were equally invested in winning the case, 
t(48) = -0.64, p = .529 (switch M = 4.64, SD = 1.22; stay M = 4.40, SD = 1.44), and felt equally 
competitive with the other team, t(48) = -0.80, p = .431 (switch M = 4.64, SD = 1.75; stay M = 
4.24, SD = 1.81).  Participants in the switch and stay conditions were also equally attached to 
their teammates, feeling equally connected to their teammates, t(48) = 1.30, p = .200 (switch M = 
4.64, SD = 1.67; stay M = 4.92, SD = 1.44), and liking them equally, t(48) = 0.64, p = .527 
(switch M = 5.48, SD = 1.12; stay M = 5.88, SD = 1.05).  However, participants in the switch 
condition were less happy about the team they were going to be on when they returned for 
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session 2, t(48) = 2.43, p = .019 (switch M = 4.12, SD = 1.72; stay M = 5.12, SD = 1.13), 
suggesting that participants preferred to remain on the same team. 
 Participants in the switch and stay conditions did not differ in how much they enjoyed the 
unpleasant task, t(48) = 0.23, p = .823, (switch M = 2.96, SD = 1.84; stay M = 3.08, SD = 1.94), 
or in how much they wanted it to stop, t(47) = -0.59, p = .530 (switch M = 4.88, SD = 1.94; stay 
M = 4.54, SD = 2.11).  (1 participant did not answer the question about how much they wanted 
the task to stop.) 
 Returning for session 2.  All but one participant (98%) returned for the second session.  
This indicates that participants expected to return for the second session and complete the pages 
that they had left for that time. 
  Effect of switching teams on patience.  I predicted that participants who expected to 
switch teams would leave more of the unpleasant task to the second session than those who 
expected to stay on the same team.  As predicted, an independent samples t-test revealed that 
participants in the switch condition left more pages of the unpleasant task to the second session 
(M = 5.16, SD = 2.82) than did participants in the stay condition (M = 2.12, SD = 3.06), t(48) = 
3.65, p = .001, d = 1.03 (see Figure 1).  The effect size for this analysis exceeded Cohen’s (1988) 
convention for a large effect (d = 0.80).   
 There are two striking features of this effect.  First, the effect is very large, with 
participants in the switch condition leaving more than twice as many pages to the second session.  
Second, participants in the stay condition were very patient, completing an average of 8.88 out of 
11 pages in the first session.  This study does not include a baseline measure of how patient 
participants would have been if were they not assigned to a team, but group membership may 
have pushed participants in opposite directions: participants in the stay condition may have been 
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more patient because their future selves were in-group members, whereas participants in the 
switch condition may have been less patient because their future selves were out-group members. 
 
 
 
 
Assignment to the prosecution or defense.  I ran an analysis of variance (ANOVA) to 
test whether the effect of switching teams interacted with the team to which participants were 
assigned (prosecution or defense).   This analysis revealed a main effect switching teams on the 
number of pages of the unpleasant task that participants left to the second session, F(1, 46) = 
12.90, p = .001.   However, there was no main effect of team (prosecution or defense), F(1, 46) = 
1.21, p = .277, and no interaction between switching teams and team, F(1, 46) = 0.37, p = .546.  
Given this, all analyses collapsed across the team to which participants were assigned.   
 Participant sex.  I also ran an ANOVA to test whether the effect of switching teams 
Figure 1.  Pages of the unpleasant task that participants left to the 
second session in experiment 1.  Error bars reflect the standard 
error around each mean.   
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interacted with participant sex.  This analysis revealed a main effect switching teams on the 
number of pages of the unpleasant task that participants left to the second session, F(1, 46) = 
12.40, p = .001.  However, there was no main effect of participant sex, F(1, 46) = 0.56, p = .458, 
and no interaction between participant sex and switching teams, F(1, 46) = 0.08, p = .786.  Given 
this, all analyses collapsed across participant sex.      
Mediation by future self connection.  I predicted that participants who expected to 
switch teams would feel less connected to their future selves in a week, and that this  would 
partially mediate the effect of switching teams on the amount of the unpleasant task that they left 
to the second session.  As predicted, participants in the switch condition (M = 3.56, SD = 1.33) 
felt significantly less connected to their future selves than did participants in the stay condition 
(M = 4.88, SD = 1.42), t(48) = 3.39, p = .001.  Participants in the switch condition (M = 4.12, SD 
= 1.36) also felt significantly less similar to their future selves than did participants in the stay 
condition (M = 5.20, SD = 1.53), t(48) = 2.64, p = .011.  Finally, participants in the switch 
condition liked their future selves significantly less (M= 4.48, SD=1.39) than did participants in 
the stay condition (M = 5.84, SD = 0.94), t(48) = 4.05, p < .001.   
These three questions were intercorrelated: how connected participants felt to their future 
selves was positively correlated with how much they liked their future selves, r(48) = .675, p 
< .001, and how similar they felt to their future selves, r(48) = .595, p < .001.  Likewise, how 
similar participants felt to their future selves was positively correlated with how much they liked 
their future selves, r(48) = .584, p < .001.  Given these strong intercorrelations, I averaged the 
three questions into a future self connection score (α = .827).  Participants in the switch condition 
(M = 4.05, SD = 1.15) had lower future self connection scores than did participants in the stay 
condition (M = 5.31, SD = 1.08), t(48) = 3.99, p < .001.   
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Future self connection scores were negatively correlated with the number of pages of the 
unpleasant task that participants left to the second session, N = 50, r = -.394, p = .005.  (Number 
of pages left was negatively correlated with connection, N = 50, r = -.393, p = .005, and liking, N 
= 50, r = -.388, p = .005, and marginally negatively correlated with similarity, N = 50, r = -.247, 
p = .084.)  
Thus, analyses revealed that (a) expecting to switch teams increased the amount of the 
unpleasant task that participants left to the second session, (b) expecting to switch teams 
decreased participants’ connection to their future selves, and (c) the less connected participants 
felt to their future selves, the more of the unpleasant task they left to the second session.  This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that participants who expected to switch teams left more of the 
unpleasant task to the second session in part because they felt less connected to their future 
selves.   
However, a bootstrapping analysis (Hayes, 2013) revealed that future self connection 
scores did not significantly mediate the effect of switching teams on the number of pages of the 
unpleasant task that participants left to the second session, although the CI approached 
significance, 95% CI [-0.14, 1.80].  This may be because mediation analyses often require 
relatively large sample sizes to be significant; the sample in this study provided adequate power 
to detect the large main effects of switching teams, but is insufficient to detect most mediation 
effects (Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007).   
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Mood in session 1.   Switching teams had no effect on either positive affect scores, t(46) 
= 0.30, p = .746, or negative affect scores, t(46) = 1.15, p = .258, and neither positive affect 
scores, r(46) = -.112, p = .447, nor negative affect scores, r(46) = .177, p = .229, were correlated 
with the number of pages of the unpleasant task that participants left to the second session.  
(These analyses excluded 2 participants who did not complete all of the PANAS.) 
Discussion 
Participants who expected to switch teams when they returned for the second part of a 
legal debate left more than twice as much unpleasant work for their future selves to complete 
when they returned.  Participants in the switch condition also felt less connected to their future 
selves, felt less similar to their future selves, and liked their future selves less, and participants’ 
feelings toward their future selves predicted the amount of the unpleasant task that they left to 
Figure 2.  Standardized regression coefficients for the relationships 
between switching teams, future self connection scores, and pages of the 
unpleasant task left to the second session in experiment 1 (the coefficient 
for the effect of switching teams on pages left controlling for future self 
connection scores is in parentheses).  The mediation effect did not reach 
statistical significance, 95% CI [-0.14, 1.80]. 
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the second session.   
 These results suggest that participants in the switch condition left more of the unpleasant 
task to the future because they felt less connected to their future selves.  However, one plausible 
alternative explanation (the bad mood now hypothesis) is that participants in the switch condition 
were less happy at the end of session 1, and this made them averse to doing the unpleasant task at 
that time.  In other words, they may have left more of the unpleasant task for their future selves 
to do simply because of how they felt, and not because of how they felt about their future selves.   
 It is not difficult to imagine that participants would feel demoralized if they prepared to 
advocate for one position and then learned that they would have to switch teams and advocate for 
the opposite position, against their own teammates.  Participants in the switch condition did not 
report being in a worse mood than participants in the stay condition, and participants’ mood did 
not predict the amount of the unpleasant task that they left to the second session.  However, these 
null effects do not definitively rule out the bad mood now hypothesis; it is possible that 
participants in the switch condition did feel less happy in a way that their self-reports failed to 
reflect.  Study 3b added a manipulation to address this possibility. 
A second alternative explanation for study 3a’s results (the bad mood later hypothesis) is 
that participants in the switch condition left more of the unpleasant task for the second session 
because they expected to feel so unhappy when they returned that they did not think the 
unpleasant task could make them feel much worse.  Study 3b addressed this possibility by 
including a question that asked participants how they expected to feel when they returned for the 
second session.   
Study 3b 
Study 3b added a manipulation to rule out the bad mood now hypothesis.  As in study 3a, 
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participants expected to either switch teams or stay on the same team.  However, half of the 
participants thought that they were dividing the unpleasant task with their future selves (as in 
study 3a), whereas the other half thought that they were dividing the unpleasant task with another 
participant.  The logic was that if participants who expect to switch teams are simply unhappy 
and therefore averse to doing the unpleasant task, it should not matter whether the remainder of 
the task falls to their future selves or to another participant.  On the other hand, if participants 
who expect to switch teams leave more of the unpleasant task because they feel less connected to 
their future selves, they should do less of the unpleasant task only when the remainder will fall to 
their future selves, and not when the remainder will fall to another participant. 
Study 3b also addressed the bad mood later hypothesis by including a question that asked 
participants how they expected to feel when they returned for the second session.4  
Participants 
59 undergraduates from Harvard University were recruited through the Harvard Study 
Pool.  Four participants were omitted because they were suspicious of the study’s premises, and 
one because she had participated in the prior version of the study (study 3a).  This left 54 
participants for analysis (51% female; MAge = 20.02 years, SD = 1.80 years, range = 18 to 25 
years).  Participation took two and a half hours, divided into two parts, and participants were 
compensated with $25 or course credit.  Due to changes in Harvard Study Pool protocol, 
participants were partially compensated at end of part 1 and received the rest of their 
compensation at the end of part 2, instead of receiving full compensation at the end of the second 
                                               
4 Including a question that asked participants how they expected to feel in the second session also 
allowed me to determine whether participants in the switch condition left more of the unpleasant 
task because they expected to feel better when they returned (e.g.  because of the novelty of 
arguing for a new team), although this hypothesis was less likely than the reverse given that 
participants preferred to remain on the same team. 
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part (as in study 3a). 
Measures and Procedure 
The procedure for study 3b was identical to that for study 3a, except for the way that 
participants divided the unpleasant task.  Half of participants divided the unpleasant task under 
exactly the same conditions as in study 3a, dividing the eleven pages of the unpleasant task 
between their current selves and their future selves (the self-finisher condition).  The other half of 
participants instead divided the unpleasant task between their current selves and another 
participant (the other-finisher condition).   
When it was time to divide the task, participants in the other-finisher condition were told 
that the experimenter was helping a graduate student pilot a pattern recognition task.  
Participants were told that there were eleven pages left of the task, and that all eleven pages 
needed to be completed by the end of the day.  Critically, they were also told that one more 
participant was coming in later that day who would finish any of the eleven pages that were left 
undone.  (Participants were given no other information about this other participant, who in reality 
did not exist.) Participants were told that they had enough time to complete all eleven pages, and 
were given the option to do as much or as little of the unpleasant task as they wished.  After 
completing a few practice questions, participants decided how many pages of the unpleasant task 
they wanted to complete by putting the rest of the pages in a folder for the next participant.   
Study 3b also added a question that asked participants how they expected to feel when 
they returned for the second session.  This question was added to the questionnaire that all 
participants completed at the end of the study. 
Results  
 Manipulation checks.  Participants assigned to the prosecution and those assigned to the 
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defense were equally invested in their teams.  Prosecution and defense participants were equally 
invested in winning the case, t(52) = -1.15, p = .255 (prosecution M = 4.30, SD = 1.61; defense 
M = 4.74, SD = 1.20), were equally convinced that the team they had argued for in session 1 had 
the more valid case, t(52) = 0.34, p = .738 (prosecution M = 5.41, SD = 1.55; defense M = 5.26, 
SD = 1.68), felt equally competitive with the other team, t(52) = -1.04, p = .302 (prosecution M = 
4.33, SD = 1.73; defense M = 4.79, SD = 1.47), were equally confident that their team would 
win, t(52) = -1.00, p = .318 (prosecution M = 4.59, SD = 1.47; defense M = 5.00, SD = 1.49), 
liked their teammates from session 1 equally, t(52) = 0.69, p = .493 (prosecution M = 5.67, SD = 
1.21; defense M = 5.44, SD = 1.16), and felt equally connected to their teammates, t(52) = 0.188, 
p = .852 (prosecution M = 4.81, SD = 1.36; defense M = 4.74, SD = 1.53).   
 I collapsed across assignment to the prosecution or defense to look at the effect of 
switching teams.  Participants in the switch condition (M = 4.21, SD = 1.22) and participants in 
the stay condition (M = 4.85, SD = 1.55) were equally invested in winning the case, t(52) = 1.65, 
p = .104, and were equally likely to think that their session 1 team had the more valid case, t(52) 
= -1.14, p = .261 (switch M = 5.57, SD = 1.45; stay M = 5.08, SD = 1.74).  Participants in the 
switch and stay conditions were equally attached to their teammates, feeling equally connection 
to their teammates, t(52) = 1.10, p = .277 (switch M = 4.57, SD = 1.50; stay M = 5.00, SD = 
1.36), and liking them equally, t(52) = 0.82, p = .416 (switch M = 5.43, SD = 1.20; stay M = 
5.69, SD = 1.16).   
Participants in the switch condition were less confident that they would win when they 
returned, t(52) = 4.65, p < .001 (switch M = 4.00, SD = 1.44; stay M = 5.59, SD = 1.05), and less 
competitive with the other team, t(52) = 2.61, p = .012 (switch M = 4.04, SD = 1.57; stay M = 
5.11, SD = 1.48).  Participants in the switch condition were also less excited to return, t(52) = 
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3.76, p < .001 (switch M = 3.86, SD = 1.41; stay M = 5.19, SD = 1.27), and less happy about the 
team they would be on when they returned, t(52) = 3.67, p = .001 (switch M = 3.93, SD = 1.74; 
stay M = 5.54, SD = 1.36), suggesting that participants preferred to remain on the same team. 
 Participants in the switch and stay conditions did not differ in how much they enjoyed the 
unpleasant task, t(52) = 1.06, p = .953 (switch M = 3.82, SD = 1.77; stay M = 3.85, SD = 1.94), 
or in how much they wanted it to stop, t(52) = .768, p = .446 (switch M = 3.61, SD = 1.85; stay 
M = 4.00, SD = 1.94).   
 Returning for session 2.  5 participants (17%) failed to return for the second session.  
These participants participated near the end of the semester, during finals period.  The 
participants who failed to return for the second session were no more likely to be in the switch 
than the stay condition, N = 25, χ2(1) = 0.22, p = .641, and were no more likely to be in the self-
finisher than the other-finisher conditions, χ2(1) = 1.36, p = .243).  Thus, there is no reason to be 
concerned that participants in certain conditions were less likely to expect to return for the 
second session.   
 Effects of the manipulations on patience.  I predicted that participants who expected to 
switch teams would leave more of the unpleasant task to their future selves, but not to another 
participant.  Thus, I predicted an interaction between the effect of switching teams on the amount 
of the unpleasant task that participants completed and whether participants divided the task with 
their future selves or another participant.  An ANOVA testing this interaction revealed a main 
effect of switching teams on the number of pages of the unpleasant task that participants left in 
the folder, F(1, 51) = 10.44, p = .002, a main effect of the recipient of the pages in the folder 
(future self or other), F(1, 51) = 23.92, p < .001, and a significant interaction between the two, 
F(1, 51) = 8.38, p = .006 (see Figure 3).   
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Simple effects analyses revealed that the results from the self-finisher condition strongly 
replicated the results of study 3a.  Participants who expected to switch teams (M = 0.71, SD = 
1.44) left more pages of the unpleasant task to their future selves than did participants who 
expected to remain on the same team (M = 4.93, SD = 2.34), t(27) = -5.79, p < .001.  This effect 
size was again large, Cohen’s d = 2.17.   
Critically, results from the other-finisher condition demonstrated that switching teams 
had no effect on the number of pages of the unpleasant task that participants left to another 
participant (N = 25, M = 6.08, SD = 2.87 for stay, M = 6.31, SD = 3.28 for switch), t(24) = -0.19, 
p = .850.  Although participants in the other-finisher condition tended to leave about half of the 
unpleasant task, there was significant variation (average SD = 3.02 pages).  Thus, switching 
teams did not fail to influence participants in the other-finisher condition because these 
participants felt uniformly compelled (e.g. by a dominant social norm) to leave half of the 
unpleasant task to the other participant. 
Replicating the results of study 3a, participants in the self-finisher condition who 
expected to stay on the same team were very patient, completing an average of 10.29 out of 11 
pages in the first session.  It was only when participants in the self-finisher condition expected to 
switch teams that they left about half of the unpleasant task to their future selves (completing 
6.07 out of 11 pages), leaving about the same amount of the task to the future as participants in 
the other-finisher conditions left to another participant (the number of pages that participants in 
the self-finisher and other-finisher conditions completed in session 1 did not differ when 
participants expected to switch teams, t(26) = -1.29, p = .209).   
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Assignment to the prosecution or defense.  I ran an ANOVA to test whether the two 
primary manipulations interacted with the team to which participants were assigned (prosecution 
or defense).  This analysis revealed a main effect of switching teams on the number of pages of 
the unpleasant task that participants left in the folder, F(1, 47) = 9.48, p = .003, a main effect of 
the recipient of the pages in the folder (future self or other), F(1, 47) = 23.55, p < .001, and a 
significant interaction between the two, F(1, 47) = 8.46, p = .006.  However, there was no main 
effect of team (prosecution or defense), F(1, 47) = 0.36, p = .553, and no interaction between 
team and any of the other variables, F(1, 47) = 0.18, p = .674 for the interaction with switching 
teams, F(1, 47) = 2.19, p = .146 for the interaction with recipient, and F(1, 47) = 0.001, p = .961 
 
Figure 3.  Pages of the unpleasant task that participants left to either 
the second session or another participant in experiment 2.  Error bars 
reflect the standard error around each mean.   
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for the three-way interaction.  Given this, all analyses collapsed across the team to which 
participants were assigned.   
 Participant sex.  I also ran an ANOVA to test whether the effect of switching teams 
interacted with participant sex.  This analysis revealed a main effect of switching teams on the 
number of pages of the unpleasant task that participants left in the folder, F(1, 47) = 9.26, p 
= .004, a main effect of the recipient of the pages in the folder (future self or other), F(1, 47) = 
22.07, p < .001, and a significant interaction between the two, F(1, 47) = 7.63, p = .008.  
However, there was no main effect of sex, F(1, 47) = 0.197, p = .822, and no interaction between 
sex and any other variable, F(1, 47) = 0.01, p = .926 for the interaction with switching teams, 
F(1, 47) = 1.16, p = .286 for the interaction with recipient, and F(1, 47) = 0.41, p = .810 for the 
three-way interaction.  Given this, all analyses collapsed across participant sex.      
 Mediation by future self connection.  I predicted that participants in the self-finisher 
condition who expected to switch teams would feel less connected to their future selves in a 
week, and that this would partially mediate the effect of switching teams on the amount of the 
unpleasant task that participants left to the future (all of the analyses in this section are for 
participants in the self-finisher condition because there was no effect of switching teams in the 
other-finisher condition).  As predicted, participants in the switch condition felt significantly less 
similar to their future selves (M = 3.40, SD = 1.40) than did participants in the stay condition (M 
= 5.14, SD = 1.56), t(27) =3.20, p = .003.  Participants in the switch condition liked their future 
selves significantly less (M = 3.88, SD = 1.82) than did participants in the stay condition (M = 
6.14, SD = 0.77), t(27) = 4.45, p < .001.  Participants in the switch condition (M = 3.40, SD = 
1.40) also trended toward feeling less connected to their future selves than did participants in the 
stay condition (M = 4.43, SD = 1.87), t(27) = 1.68, p = .104.  (These analyses have smaller 
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sample sizes than those in study 3a, which could explain why the effect of switching teams on 
participants’ connection to their future selves did not reach significance in this study.) 
These three questions were intercorrelated: how similar participants felt to their future 
selves was positively correlated with how much they liked their future selves, N = 29, r = .570, p 
= .001, and how connected they felt to their future selves, N = 29, r = .713, p < .001.  Likewise, 
how connected participants felt to their future selves was marginally positively correlated with 
how much they liked their future selves, N = 29, r = .319, p = .091.5 Given these 
intercorrelations, I averaged the three questions into a future self connection score (α = .765).  
Participants in the switch condition had significantly lower future self connection scores (M = 
3.58, SD = 1.16) than did participants in the stay condition (M = 5.24, SD = 1.11), t(27) = 3.92, p 
= .001.  
Future self connection scores were negatively correlated with the number of pages of the 
unpleasant task that participants left to the second session, N = 29, r = -.620, p < .001.  (Number 
of pages left was negatively correlated with similarity, N = 29, r = -.397, p = .033, liking, N = 29, 
r = -.719, p < .001, and connection, N = 29, r = -.620, p <.  001.)  
Thus, analyses revealed that (a) expecting to switch teams increased the amount of the 
unpleasant task that participants left to the second session, (b) expecting to switch teams 
decreased participants’ connection to their future selves, and (c) the less connected participants 
felt to their future selves, the more of the unpleasant task they left to the second session.  This is 
consistent with the hypothesis that participants who expected to switch teams left more of the 
unpleasant task to the second session in part because they felt less connected to their future 
                                               
5All three questions were highly intercorrelated when analyzing the entire data set (r = .617, p < 
.001 for similarity with liking, r = .736, p < .001 for similarity with connection, r = .401, p = 
.002 for liking with connection, N = 55 for all).   
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selves.  Further supporting this hypothesis, a bootstrapping analysis (Hayes, 2013) revealed that 
participants’ connection with their future selves significantly mediated the effect of switching 
teams on the amount of the unpleasant task that they left to the second session, 95% CI [.018, 
3.13].   
Participants’ connection with their future selves only partially mediated the effect of 
switching teams; I entered switching teams and future self connection scores into a regression 
model in which pages left was the dependent variable, and the effect of switching teams 
remained significant, β = .582, t(26) = 2.47, p = .001. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Mood in session 1.  Switching teams had no effect on either positive affect scores, t(26) 
= -0.32, p = .754, or negative affect scores, t(26) = 0.16, p =  .872 for participants in the self 
Figure 4.  Standardized regression coefficients for the relationships 
between switching teams, future self connection scores, and pages of the 
unpleasant task left to the second session in experiment 2 (the coefficient 
for the effect of switching teams on pages left controlling for future self 
connection is in parentheses).  The mediation effect was significant, 95% 
CI [.018, 3.13]. 
 
 
 47 
 
finisher condition (all of the analyses in this section are for participants in the self-finisher 
condition because there was no effect of switching teams in the other-finisher condition that 
mood could explain).  In addition, positive affect scores, N = 28, r = -.019, p= .925 were 
uncorrelated with the number of pages of the unpleasant task that the participants left to the 
second session, although negative affect scores were marginally positively correlated with 
number of pages left, N = 28, r = .353, p = .066.  In light of this marginal correlation, I entered 
negative affect scores as a covariate in an ANCOVA testing the effect of switching teams on the 
number of pages of the unpleasant task that participants left to the second session.  Results 
revealed that the effect of switching teams remained highly significant when controlling for 
negative affect, F(25) = 37.12, p < .001.   
 Expected mood in session 2.  Study 3b added a question that asked participants how 
they expected to feel when they returned for the second session (all of the analyses in this section 
are for participants in the self-finisher condition because there was no effect of switching teams 
in the other-finisher condition that anticipated mood could explain).  Participants in the switch 
condition (M = 4.47, SD = 1.60) did not anticipate feeling any differently from participants in the 
stay condition (M = 5.14, SD = 1.29) when they returned, t(26) = 1.25, p = .223.  However, 
participants’ anticipated mood in the second session was marginally negatively correlated with 
the number of pages they left to the second session, N = 29, r = -.350, p = .063.  In light of this 
marginal correlation, I entered participants’ anticipated mood as a covariate in an ANCOVA 
testing the effect of switching teams on the number of pages of the unpleasant task that 
participants left to the second session.  Results revealed that the effect of switching teams 
remained highly significant when controlling for participants’ anticipated mood, F(26) = 29.22, p 
< .001.   
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Discussion 
 Study 3b robustly replicated the results of study 3a.  Participants in the self-finisher 
condition who expected to switch teams left more unpleasant work to complete when they 
returned for the second session in a week.  Participants in the switch condition also felt less 
connected to their future selves in a week, which in this study significantly mediated the effect of 
switching teams on the amount of unpleasant work that participants left to the second session.   
 Results from study 3b also demonstrated that switching teams had no impact on the 
amount of unpleasant work that participants left to another participant, nor on how participants 
expected to feel when they returned for the second session.  Taken together, these results suggest 
that switching teams decreased patience by changing how participants felt about their future 
selves, and not by changing how they felt or expected to feel about completing the unpleasant 
task.   
Discussion of Study Set 3 
Two studies found that participants were less patient if they expected to switch teams in 
the future.  In study 3a, participants who expected to switch teams when they returned for the 
second part of a legal debate in a week left more than twice as much unpleasant work to 
complete when they returned than did participants who expected to remain on the same team 
(Cohen’s d = 1.03).  In study 3b, participants who expected to switch teams left more than five 
times as much unpleasant work to their future selves (Cohen’s d = 2.17).   
Participants who expected to switch teams in a week also felt less connected to their 
future selves in a week, felt less similar to their future selves, and liked their future selves less.  
In turn, participants who felt less connected to their future selves (as indicated by connection, 
similarity, and liking) left more of the unpleasant task to the future, and this significantly 
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mediated the effect of switching teams in study 3b.  These results suggest that switching teams 
may have decreased patience in part through changing how participants felt about their future 
selves.  Participants who felt less connected to their future selves may have cared less about how 
they would feel when they returned for the second session.  Or they may have been less likely to 
think about their future selves at all.   
Ruling Out the Bad Mood Now Hypothesis 
 Importantly, results did not support the alternative hypothesis that participants in the 
switch condition were less patient because they were less happy at the end of session 1, and 
consequently averse to doing the unpleasant task at that time.  Participants rated their mood 
directly after learning whether they would switch teams, which was directly before they divided 
the unpleasant task.  Switching teams had no effect on participants’ self-reported mood, and 
participants’ mood did not predict the amount of the unpleasant task that they left to the future.   
Study 3b also addressed this alternative experimentally.  This study added a condition in 
which participants divided the unpleasant task between their current selves and another 
participant, rather than between their current selves and their future selves.  Results showed that 
changing groups did not affect the amount of work that participants left to another participant; it 
only increased the amount of work that they left to their future selves.  This indicates that 
participants in the switch condition were not more averse to completing the unpleasant task 
during session 1, they were less motivated to spare their future selves unpleasant work. 
Ruling Out the Bad Mood Later Hypothesis 
Another alternative hypothesis is that participants in the switch condition expected to feel 
so unhappy during session 2 that they did not think the unpleasant task could make them feel 
much worse.  Study 3b found that switching teams had no effect on how participants expected to 
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feel when they returned for the second session.  However, it is possible that participants in the 
switch condition did expect to feel differently in a way that my question failed to detect.  An 
additional test of this alternative would be to ask participants to divide a pleasant task between 
their present and future selves (e.g. eating chocolate), rather than an unpleasant one.  If 
participants in the switch condition expect to feel worse when they return for the second session, 
and if these expectations mediate their decisions about how to apportion tasks, then they should 
leave more of a pleasant task for their future selves.  On the other hand, if (as I expect) 
participants in the switch condition feel less connected to their future selves, and this mediates 
their decisions about how to apportion tasks, then participants in the switch condition should 
leave less of the pleasant task for their future selves.   
Groups Change Many Things 
Taken together, the results of these two studies suggest that participants who expected to 
switch teams left more unpleasant work to the future in part because they felt less connected to 
their future selves.  However, participants’ feelings toward their future selves did not account for 
the full effect of switching teams on patience in either study.  This is not surprising, particularly 
considering the large sizes of the effects.  Group membership influences how people treat others 
through multiple means (e.g. Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011; Doise et al., 1972; Hertel & Kerr, 
2001; Mullen, Brown, & Smith, 1992; Simpson, 2006; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; 
Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008); it may influence patience through multiple means as well.   
For instance, people often have more favorable implicit attitudes toward in-groups than 
out-groups, and these attitudes can impact behavior toward members of these groups (e.g. 
Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Greenwald, McGhee, Schwartz, 1998; Greenwald, Poehlman, 
Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009; Heiphetz, Spelke, & Banaji, 2013; Hofman, Gawronski, 
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Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005; McConnell & Leibold, 2001; Turner & Crisp, 2010; van 
Ravenzwaaij, van der Maas, & Wagenmakers, 2011; Wilson, Lindsey, & Schooler, 2000).  
Participants may have had less favorable implicit attitudes toward their future selves, and 
therefore have been less patient, when they expected to leave their in-group and join the out-
group.    
You’re Still Me, I Just Don’t Like You Anymore 
It is novel that these studies changed how participant felt toward their future selves 
without suggesting that their future selves would be fundamentally different from their present 
selves.  Past studies have found a relationship between participants’ connection or similarity to 
their future selves and patience, but have confounded connection or similarity with the degree to 
which participants expect their fundamental traits to change (e.g. Bartels & Urminsky, 2011, told 
participants that their ‘core identity and traits were very likely/unlikely to change over the 
coming year,’ see also Ersner-Hershfield et al., 2009; Bartels & Rips, 2010).  The present studies 
avoided this confound.  The manipulation in these studies only entailed assigning participants to 
switch legal teams in a court case—nothing about the manipulation suggested that participants’ 
traits would change any more if they switched teams than if they stayed on the same team.   
To my knowledge, these are the first studies to demonstrate that a factor that affects 
altruism can also affect patience without leading participants to believe that they will be 
fundamentally different in the future.  These were also the first studies to manipulate how much 
participants liked their future selves, suggesting that a wider range of feelings toward others can 
be directed toward our future selves. 
A Common Influence on Patience and Altruism 
 The present studies demonstrate that a pervasive determinant of altruism—group 
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membership—can also affect patience.  However, they do not show that the same manipulation 
of group membership affects both altruism and patience; this would require an additional study 
using the same paradigm to demonstrate that participants leave less unpleasant work to other 
participants who are in their group, compared to those in the out-group.   
Past research has shown that group membership influences a form of altruism that is very 
similar to the measure of patience used in the present studies (e.g. Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008).  
Further, the present studies employed a manipulation of group membership that is likely to 
promote particularly strong in-group favoritism (Blake & Mouton, 1962; Cikara, Botvinik, & 
Fiske, 2011; Sherif et.  al., 1962).  This, combined with the robustness of in-group favoritism 
across decades of psychological research (e.g. Cikara, Bruneau, & Saxe, 2011; Doise et al., 
1972; Hertel & Kerr, 2001; Jetten, Spears & Manstead, 1992; Kramer & Brewer, 1984; Mullen, 
Brown & Smith, 1992; Rabbie & Horowitz, 1969; Simpson, 2006; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & 
Flament, 1971; Yamagishi & Mifune, 2008), gives me confidence that my manipulation of group 
membership would affect how participants treat others in the same way that it affected how they 
treated their future selves.   
However, should my manipulation fail to influence altruism, it would still be plausible 
that it influenced patience through the same means (e.g. feelings of connection and liking) that 
other manipulations of group membership influence altruism.  Past research suggests that almost 
any division into groups can impact how we treat others (e.g. Doise et al., 1972; Hertel & Kerr, 
200 Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971), but that doesn’t mean that every division has an 
equally strong impact on how we treat everyone.  If a given manipulation of group membership 
impacts patience but not altruism, it may be because it influences connection with our future 
selves more strongly than it influences connection with others.  
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
 We shape our lives by deciding when we will—and won’t—sacrifice for the future.  
Today we choose whether to save or spend, run or sit, stay true or cheat; tomorrow we find 
ourselves wealthy or poor, healthy or fit, loved or despised.  Three sets of studies suggest that 
sacrifice for the future may be governed by the same rules that govern sacrifice for others.  These 
studies found that patience was correlated with altruism and with empathic accuracy, a factor 
that predicted altruism.  Further, a major influence on altruism—group membership—also 
influenced patience.  Participants left more than twice as much unpleasant work to the future if 
they expected to switch groups, an effect that was mediated by participants’ connection to their 
future selves.   
 These results suggest that group membership may exert as powerful an influence on how 
we treat our future selves as it does on how we treat others.  One of the most pervasive 
determinants of whether we help others is whether they are in our group (e.g. Hertel & Kerr, 
2001; Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971; Yamagishi & Mifune, 20008).  We are often 
attached to the groups that we’re in (Brewer, 1999; Milonov, 2009; Turner, Hogg, Oakes, 
Reicher, & Wetherell, 1987); and yet, as we age, our group memberships naturally change—
from liberal college student to investment banker, swinging single to married-with mortgage, 
hardworking New Yorker to retired Floridian—and we find ourselves belonging to groups that 
we once regarded as alien.  The present studies suggest that we connect with our future selves 
less, and therefore are less patient, when we expect to leave our current group and become a 
member of a new one.   
The change from in-group member to out-group member in the present studies was only a 
week away.  This implies that our connection to our future selves may wax and wane with 
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relative ease, influencing not only our long-term decisions, but also those whose consequences 
come next Tuesday.  Our future selves may become alien sooner than we think. 
When Does Self Become Other? 
 When does ‘me now’ become ‘me in the future’?  Previous studies have shown that we 
feel distinct from selves a year away (Bartels & Rips, 2010; Bartels & Urminsky, 2011; Ersner-
Hershfield et al., 2009); the present research shows that we feel distinct from selves a week 
away.  Future studies may find that the divide is sooner still.  Perhaps there is something special 
about going to sleep and then waking up to a new morning that makes us represent our future 
selves tomorrow as distinct from the selves we are today.  Perhaps we can feel separate from 
who we will become in a few hours, or a few minutes.  Or perhaps the change in context that we 
expect to experience is as important as the time that will pass; we may not distinguish between 
our present self and our five-minutes-in-the-future self if in five minutes we will still be sitting in 
the same chair listening to the same lecture; but we may feel distinct from that self if in five 
minutes we will have left our chair to get up on stage.  If the point in time when we start 
representing our future selves as distinct from our present selves corresponds to a sharp decrease 
in patience, this will be further evidence that we are often impatient because we view future 
benefits as going to someone else. 
Why Do We Shortchange Our Future Selves? 
If, as the present research suggests, we view our future selves like others, there are many 
reasons that this may lead us to shortchange them.  As things move farther from the here and 
now in time or social distance, we tend to represent them with less vivid concrete detail (Maglio, 
Trope, & Liberman, 2013; Trope & Liberman, 2003; van Boven, Kane, & McGraw, 2010).  This 
implies that, just as with others (Liviatan, Trope, & Liberman, 2008; Maglio, Trope, & 
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Liberman, 2013), we are less likely to focus on the internal experiences that our future selves 
may have because they are psychologically distant (we don’t represent the joy of receiving $10 
in a month as vividly as the joy of receiving $10, or maybe even $20, now; Pronin, Olivola, and 
Kennedy, 2008; Pronin & Ross, 2006).6 
 Additionally, because the present self is not just a concept but a lived experience (e.g. 
James, 1890), we have firsthand experiences in the present that are more intense than imagining 
the experiences of our future selves or others;7 as horrible as it feels to imagine being stabbed in 
the eye, it feels worse still to experience it directly.  For this reason, if kindness to others or our 
future selves is at odds with temptations in the here and now, it can be a tough battle for altruism 
or patience to win.8  
Finally, the studies in this dissertation demonstrate that representing our future selves as 
distinct from our present selves allows for our feelings toward our future selves to impact how 
                                               
6Another interesting piece of research suggesting that temporal and social distance may have 
analogous effects on patience and altruism is the finding that the amount of money a person is 
willing to forgo in order to give money to another person decreases as a hyperbolic function of 
the perceived social distance between them, just as the amount of money people are willing to 
forgo now to receive more money in the future decreases as a hyperbolic function of the amount 
of delay (Jones & Rachlin, 2006; Rachlin & Jones, 2008).   
 
7Although they may not be as intense as direct experience, we do have emotional reactions to 
imagining both future experiences and other people’s experiences, even using the same parts of 
our brain to simulate these experiences (Anderson & Phelps, 2001; Avenanti et al., 2006; 
Breitner, Aharon, Kahneman, Dale, & Shizgal, 2001; Gilbert, 2006; Gilbert & Wilson, 2007; 
Kavanagh, Andrade, & May, 2005; Kosslyn et al., 1999; McGuire, Shah, & Murray, 1993; 
Phelps et al., 2001; Singer et al., 2004; Wicker et al., 2003).  These emotional reactions may be 
the reason we do sometimes overcome present temptations to be altruistic or patient. 
8This may be the reason that we are often less patient when a temptation is literally right in front 
of us (cake on the table, stilettos in the window, cigarette in our friend’s hand) than we are when 
making a tradeoff between a consequence that we imagine happening relatively soon, and a 
consequence that we imagine happening relatively less soon ($5 at the end of the experiment or 
$10 later), even relative to short-term rewards delayed by only a few minutes (McClure, Ericson, 
Laibson, Loewenstein, & Cohen, 2007; Rosati, Stevens, Hare, & Hauser, 2007).     
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we treat them, just as our feelings toward others impact how we treat others (Batson, 1990; 
Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987; Caprara, Alessandri, & Eisenberg, 2012; Cialdini et al., 
1997).  For instance, study set 3 suggests that we are less patient when we like our future selves 
less.  Other manipulations of how much we like our future selves may have a similar influence, 
sometimes to paradoxical effect.  We may like our future selves less if we expect them to look 
back upon us with disapproval (Eastwick & Finkel, 2009; chapter 6 of Kenny, 1994), and yet we 
often disapprove of ourselves precisely because we have made impatient decisions.  If we are 
more impatient the more we dislike our future selves, anticipating that we will disapprove of our 
impatient decisions may increase our tendency to make those decisions. 
 Likewise, we tend to like fortunate people more than unfortunate people (Godfrey & 
Lowe, 1975; Lerner & Miller, 1978; Olsen, Dunham, Dweck, Spelke & Banaji, 2009; Pryor, 
Reeder, & Monroe, 2012).  If we like our future selves less when we expect them to be 
unfortunate, this may lead us to help them less precisely because they need our help more. 
The present research suggests that how we feel about our future selves can have a strong 
influence on how we treat them.  We often sacrifice for others because of the emotion we feel 
when we think about them (e.g. Aron, Aron, Tudor, & Nelson, 1991; Cialdini, Brown, Lewis, 
Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Batson et al., 1997); perhaps we are also patient because of the emotion 
we feel when we think about the future.9  
                                               
9The struggle to be patient is often framed as a battle between a system that responds to 
immediate emotional experience (e.g. ‘I want that marshmallow now!’ often termed the hot 
system) and a cognitive, emotionally neutral system that responds to abstract goals (‘I want to 
maximize the number of marshmallows I receive,’ often termed the cold system; Loewenstein, 
1996; Loewenstein, Weber, Hsee, & Welch, 2001; Metcalfe & Mitschel, 1999; Mischel et al., 
1989). However, the present research suggests that sometimes patience may come not from 
cooler reason but from feeling more emotion in favor of the patient decision. It may even be that 
a big part of what our fatigable ‘willpower’ (Baumeister, Bratslavsky, Muraven, & Tice, 1998; 
Muravan & Baumeister, 2000) does is marshal emotional ammunition for our long-term goals by 
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Conclusions 
The research in this dissertation provides converging support for the hypothesis that 
common factors promote altruism and patience.  This suggests the value of testing the hypothesis 
more broadly.  We know a lot about what increases kindness toward others; much of this may 
apply to what increases kindness toward our future selves.  By drawing on the decades of 
research investigating altruism, we may be able to learn important ways to ameliorate 
impatience.  We may also be able to better understand how we think about our future selves, and 
why it can be so hard to be nice to them.  
                                               
reminding us of values we hold dear or conjuring evocative representations of how our decisions 
will affect our future selves. 
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APPENDICES 
Appendix A  
Instructions for the Measure of Patience in Studies 1a and 1b 
Imagine that you are participating in a study of decision-making at a well-known university.  
You are seated alone in a room.  
Imagine the researcher comes into your room and tells you that you can choose between two 
options: 
•    Option A: The researcher will give you $5 right now. 
•    Option B: The researcher will send you a different amount of money one month from now. 
Imagine that the researcher really will do what he says. For each of the amounts below, please 
indicate which option you would choose in each case. 
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Appendix B 
Instructions for the Measure of Altruism in Studies 1a, 1b, and 2a 
Imagine that you and another person are participating in a study of decision-making at a well-
known university.  You and the other person arrived separately, have not seen each other, and are 
seated in separate rooms. When the study is over you will leave by separate doors and neither of 
you will ever learn the other’s identity. 
Imagine the researcher comes into your room and tells you that you can choose between two 
options: 
•    Option A: The researcher will give you $5 right now. 
•    Option B: The researcher will give the other person a different amount right now. 
Imagine that the researcher really will do what he says. For each of the amounts below, please 
indicate which option you would choose in each case. 
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 Appendix C 
Marlowe-Crowne Social Desirability Scale 
Listed below are a number of statements concerning personal attitudes and traits. Read each 
item and decide whether the statement is true or false as it pertains to your personally. It’s best 
to go with your first judgment and not spend too long mulling over any one question. 
1. Before voting I thoroughly investigate the qualifications of all the candidates. 
2. I never hesitate to go out of my way to help someone in trouble. 
3. It is sometimes hard for me to go on with my work if I am not encouraged. 
4. I have never intensely disliked anyone. 
5. On occasions I have had doubts about my ability to succeed in life. 
6. I sometimes feel resentful when I don’t get my way. 
7. I am always careful about my manner of dress. 
8. My table manners at home are as good as when I eat out in a restaurant. 
9. If I could get into a movie without paying and be sure I was not seen I would probably do it. 
10. On a few occasions, I have given up something because I thought too little of my ability. 
11. I like to gossip at times. 
12. There have been times when I felt like rebelling against people in authority even though I 
knew they were right. 
13. No matter who I’m talking to, I’m always a good listener. 
14. I can remember “playing sick” to get out of something. 
15. There have been occasions when I have taken advantage of someone. 
16. I’m always willing to admit it when I make a mistake. 
17. I always try to practice what I preach. 
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18. I don’t find it particularly difficult to get along with loudmouthed, obnoxious people. 
19. I sometimes try to get even rather than forgive and forget. 
20. When I don’t know something I don’t mind at all admitting it. 
21. I am always courteous, even to people who are disagreeable. 
22. At times I have really insisted on having things my own way. 
23. There have been occasions when I felt like smashing things. 
24. I would never think of letting someone else be punished for my wrongdoings. 
25. I never resent being asked to return a favor. 
26. I have never been irked when people expressed ideas very different from my own. 
27. I never make a long trip without checking the safety of my car. 
28. There have been times when I was quite jealous of the good fortune of others. 
29. I have almost never felt the urge to tell someone off. 
30. I am sometimes irritated by people who ask favors of me. 
31. I have never felt that I was punished without cause. 
32. I sometimes think when people have a misfortune they only got what they deserved. 
33. I have never deliberately said something that hurt someone’s feelings. 
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Appendix D 
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test (RMET) 
Instructions 
You will see a series of photographs of eyes. For each set of eyes, choose which word 
best describes what the person in the picture is thinking or feeling. Choose the word by pressing 
the key with the number that corresponds to the number for the word on the screen. You may 
feel that more than one word is applicable but please choose just one word, the word which you 
consider to be most suitable. Before making your choice, make sure that you have read all 4 
words. You should try to do the task as quickly as possible but you will not be timed. The 
questions will begin in a moment. 
Example Trial 
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Appendix E 
Instructions for the Intertemporal Choice Task from Studies 2b and 2c 
For this task, you will be asked a series of questions about whether you would prefer to 
receive $10 now, or a different amount of money at a point of time in the future. The future 
amount and point of time for the second choice will vary depending on the question. For each of 
these questions, please imagine that you are given the choice between receiving $10 right away 
from the experimenter, or receiving the other amount in a check that arrives at the designated 
time. Assume that there is no doubt about whether you will receive the amount of money you 
choose at the corresponding time.  
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Appendix F 
Future Self Questionnaire from Study 2c 
Imagine who you will be in 10 years. Imagine yourself and your life as vividly as possible. What 
will you be doing? What will you look like? Where will you live? Who will your friends be? 
Will you be married? Divorced? Really picture who you will be and what you will do on a 
typical day. 
Once you have vividly imagined who you will be in ten years, please answer the following 
questions: 
 [Connectedness Subscore.] 
1. How connected do you feel to the person that you will be in 10 years? 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
                      
 
2. How similar will you be in 10 years, relative to who you are now? 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
                   
 
3. How much affection do you feel for the person you will be in 10 years? 
 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
                      
 
 
4. How much do you like the person you will be in 10 years? 
 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
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5. How much do you care for the well being of the person you will be in 10 years? 
 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
                      
 
6. How different will you be in 10 years, relative to who you are now? * 
 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
                      
 
7. How alienated do you feel from the person you will be in 10 years? * 
 
 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
                      
 
 
8. To what degree will you like the same things in 10 years that you like now? 
 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
                      
 
9. To what degree will you be the same person in 10 years that you are now? 
 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
                      
 
10. How much do you prefer yourself now to the person you will be in 10 years? * 
 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
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Now imagine that in 10 years, you develop back problems. Your back begins to hurt every 
day when you get out of bed. You feel sharp pain when you move in certain ways or exert 
yourself. Sometimes, you feel mild pain in your back all day. You visit several doctors, but 
none can offer a permanent solution. They explain the back pain like yours can develop as 
a result of aging, and often there is no cure. You take over-the-counter pain killers on 
particularly bad days, but they only help a little, and you realize that chronic back pain is 
something you will just have to live with. 
[Concern Subscore] 
11. How concerned are you about the possibility of developing chronic back pain in 10 
years? 
 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
                      
[Compassion subscore 
 
12. How sympathetic do you feel toward this future you? 
 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
                      
 
13. How compassionate do you feel toward this future you? 
 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
                      
 
14. How warm do you feel toward this future you? 
 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
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15. How tender do you feel toward this future you? 
 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
                      
 
16. How moved do you feel when you think about this future you? 
 
 
      1    2    3   4   5  6           7 
Not at all               Extremely  
                      
 
*Indicates an item that was reverse-scored  
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Appendix G  
Adapted PANAS  
This scale consists of a number of words that describe different feelings and emotions. Read each 
item and then circle the appropriate answer under the word to indicate to what extent you feel this 
way right now, that is, at the present moment.  
 
Good 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
 
Interested 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
 
Distressed 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
 
Excited  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
 
Upset 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
 
Competitive 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
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                    or not at all  
 
Engaged 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
 
Hostile 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
 
 
Enthusiastic 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
 
Irritable 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
 
Alert 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
 
Happy 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
 
Nervous 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
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Determined 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
 
Attentive 
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
 
Active  
1  2  3  4  5 
 
                   very slightly          a little           moderately       quite a bit         extremely 
                    or not at all  
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Appendix H 
Script from Studies 3a and 3b 
Hi and thank you for coming to participate in our experiment! I just wanted to let you 
know that in order to standardize the procedure for all participants, I am going to be reading 
you the instructions as we go along. 
OK we're ready to get started. Just so that you know, because this is a two-part study you 
will receive credit or payment when you come back next week, at the end of part 2. 
In today's study we are looking at how people collaborate online. To do this we are 
grouping participants into teams and asking them to debate one side of a civil court case 
involving custody rights. Some participants are assigned to the defense team, and some are 
assigned to the prosecution team.  Today, you and two other participants have been assigned to 
the [defense/prosecution] team. Because we are focused on online communication, we arranged 
it so that each of you arrives at a slightly different time than the others in order to avoid any kind 
of contact that might bias the online conversation. After reading about the case, the three of you 
will work together in an online chat to discuss your side of the debate against the 
[prosecution/defense], which we will hold when you return for the second session.  
Please read through the materials (show them the materials, already on the desk) about 
your case and the position you will take as a member of the [prosecution/defense]. Once you are 
finished reading the materials just open the door and let me know. Because of how many 
participants are in this experiment, each of you has been assigned a specific researcher to make 
the process run more smoothly. I am your assigned researcher so if you ever have any questions 
please ask me.   
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Do you have any questions about this? Okay, let me know when you finish, It shouldn’t 
take more than 10 minutes.  
Okay, now that you have familiarized yourself with the case materials, I will sign you into 
a group chat via gchat with the members of your group so that you can discuss them online.  
In order to standardize the format of the conversation, we have assigned roles to the 
members of your group. Participant 1 will give their opinion about question one, followed by 
participant 2, and then you will respond third with your opinion regarding that question, and the 
same response order goes for question 2 and so on. Does this make sense? Participant 1 will to 
initiate the chat, which should start in a moment. Please do not type anything in the chat box 
until Participants 1 and 2 are finished with their responses. And make sure to let the other 
participants know when you’re done with your answer.  It’s important for the chats to have a 
consistent format, so please follow this structure when you discuss the case with your teammates. 
Do you have any questions? Good!  When you have finished discussing the questions just 
open the door and let me know. Again, please remember that the gchat transcripts are going to 
be analyzed so make sure that you follow the format and only talk about material related to the 
case.  
I will be in the hall so feel free to open the door if you have any questions during the 
group discussion.  
Stay Condition 
All set? Great! That's all for this first study today. When you return next week, you will 
be joining your other teammates to debate on behalf of the [prosecution/defense], against the 
team arguing for the [defense/prosecution.] Do you have any questions about this?   
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Switch Condition (Memorize this Section) 
All set? Great! That's all for this first study today. Because of some cancellations, when 
you return next week you will actually be switching to the [prosecution/defense] team since we 
need to even out the numbers in the debate. So instead of arguing for the [prosecution/defense], 
when you return next week you'll be a member of the opposite team, arguing against the two 
team members you worked with today, with the members of the [defense/prosecution]. Do you 
have any questions about this? 
Everyone 
Now we are going to start the second, unrelated study. We often like to bundle studies 
together because it saves people the inconvenience of coming in for only a short time.  
This second study is from a colleague who is interested in pattern recognition. For this 
task, you need to find all of the animal names embedded in lines of letters. For example (show 
them the example on the packet).  
Give them the PANAS form and the first page with the practice problems.  
Please fill out the questionnaire first and then do the practice problems to get the hang of 
the task and let me know when you are finished.  
All set? Thanks! The task is just like that all the way through. There's time for this task 
both this session and next session, so you can divide it up between sessions however you want. 
Whatever you don't do now, you'll do next week after you debate for the [prosecution/defense]. 
So just think about how many pages you want to leave for yourself to do next week after the 
debate, and put them in this folder so that I can add them to your paperwork for next session. I 
have to go check on something, but I'll be back in a minute to collect your part 2 folder. 
Leave and let them divide it up  
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Thanks! You can start working on the pages you've allocated for this session and come 
find me in the hall when you're done.   
Leave and wait for the participant to finish. 
Great! You're almost done with part 1. We just need you to fill out a few questionnaires. 
Just fill these out in order, and open the door when you are done. 
For the Switch Condition 
When filling out the questionnaire please keep in mind that you will be on the other team 
next week, rather than the team you were on today.  
Everyone 
  Thanks! That's all for part 1. Don't forget that you'll receive your payment or credit after 
completing part 2. I look forward to seeing you next week. 
Debriefing Questions 
1. Do you have any thoughts about what we might be looking for in this study? 
2. What did you think of the court case? 
3. What did you think of your teammates?  
4. Did you suspect that your teammates weren’t actually other participants?  
5. What did you think of the pattern recognition task?  
6. Was your decision about how much of the pattern recognition task to do influenced at all by 
concerns about finishing the study in time? 
7. Did you believe me when I said you have enough time to finish it all today?  
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Appendix I 
Case Materials from Studies 3a and 3b 
Case Summary and Instructions  
Mr. and Mrs. Donovan claim to be the rightful parents of Sally Washington. Janet 
Washington gave birth to Sally 5 months ago and has raised the child with her husband Richard. 
In June Sally became ill with symptoms that suggested she might have a genetic disorder that 
makes children allergic to a wide variety of foods. Concerned for her health, the Washington’s 
brought Sally to the hospital for genetic testing.  Although the tests revealed that Sally was 
perfectly healthy, they also indicated that she was not the Washington’s biological child.   
Sally had been conceived through in vitro fertilization (IVF), a process by which an egg 
is fertilized by sperm outside of the body and then implanted in the patient’s uterus. IVF is a 
major treatment for infertility when other methods of assisted reproduction technology have 
failed. The only way that Mrs. Washington could have given birth to someone else’s biological 
child is if there was a mix-up between her embryos and the embryos of another women who was 
using IVF to become pregnant.  
After the hospital investigated the matter, they found out that there had indeed been a rare 
mix up between the fertilized eggs of Mrs. Washington and another patient at the hospital, Mrs. 
Donovan. When the Donovan’s were informed that Sally was actually their biological child, they 
had their attorney file a lawsuit to gain primary custody of Sally.  The Washington’s attorney 
responded and the case is set for trial. 
Your job as a member of the Donovan [Washington] Legal Team is to come up with 
a set of arguments for why Mr. and Mrs. Donovan [Mr. and Mrs. Washington] deserve to 
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have custody of Sally. On the next page there are statements from Mrs. Donovan as well as 
from Mrs. Washington.   
As you read through the statements please keep these 4 questions in mind: 
1) What are the strongest arguments in favor of your case? 
2) What are the weakest aspects of your case and how would you defend them against attack 
from the defense? 
3) What are the strongest arguments for the defense and how could you attack them? 
4) What are the weakest arguments for the defense, and how could you attack them? 
Once you read through the statements, you will discuss these questions with two other 
participants who are also members of the Donovan [Washington] Legal Team. 
Statement from Kerry Donovan 
 
My name is Kerry Donovan. I am 39 years old and co-own a computer software company 
with my husband Arthur. We live in New York City. When I was in my mid-30s Arthur and I 
decided we were ready to have a child. We tried for months but it was very hard for us to 
conceive, so we went to a fertility clinic for assistance. It turned out that I was infertile and the 
clinic suggested we try in vitro fertilization. On the third round I became pregnant. I was 
overwhelmed with joy. It was our dream come true. Tragically, I miscarried several months later. 
As difficult as it was to get through emotionally, my husband and I still deeply wanted a child. 
The doctors said we still had a good chance, and we were planning another round, but before we 
had a chance I started to go through menopause.  At that point the doctors told us that I could 
probably not ever have a child of my own.   
Then a little over a year later, the hospital contacted us to let us know that we did have a 
child! There had been a mix-up and my eggs had been given to someone else. I couldn't believe 
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that my baby was out there somewhere. All I could think was that I wanted her to come home as 
soon as possible. Being told I couldn’t have a child was bad, but not nearly as bad as finding out 
that I do have a child but can’t hold her, or love her, or raise her. I saw a picture of her, and she 
looks exactly like Arthur—his green eyes and red hair, his round face. It is so clear that she is 
our baby. I’ve cried every day since getting this news. 
It is just so horrible that the Washingtons had to go through a pregnancy thinking that the 
child was theirs when it wasn’t. Mrs. Washington was an accidental surrogate and the hospital 
has done irreparable harm to her and her husband. We really feel awful for them and hope they 
sue the hospital for all the pain and suffering they caused with their mistake. But it was their 
mistake, not ours. It's not right that my husband and I should be forced to pay for their error with 
our child’s life!    
My husband and I are Sally's real parents. Thankfully, Sally is still very young, and for 
her to come live with us will not be a difficult transition for her.  She should be able to grow up 
with her real parents.  We hope the Washingtons will try again and have her own child.  But 
Sally is the only child I will ever have. And more than that, she is my daughter. I can’t live 
knowing that someone else is raising my baby.  
Statement from Janet Washington 
My name is Janet Washington. I’m 30 years old, and until recently worked as an interior 
designer in New York City. Having a child is a dream I've always had. My husband Richard and 
I always planned to start a family, and a few years ago decided the time was right and began 
trying. After a year of trying to have a baby and unsuccessful attempts using ovulation 
stimulation shots, Richard and I decided to use IVF to have a child. It took a few tries, but when 
I found out that the IVF was a success and that I was finally pregnant, it was one of the happiest 
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moments of my life. I was going to be a mother! From then on that was the most important thing 
in my life. 
My pregnancy was by no means an easy one. I had several serious medical complications 
while pregnant with Sally and had to give up my job in order to focus on my health. However, 
when I held her for the first time and looked into her beautiful eyes, I knew that all of the 
sacrifices had been worth it. 
Sally is my little miracle, and I would do anything to keep her healthy and safe. Over the 
last five months, I've bonded with her in a way I can't describe.  My entire life is organized 
around her—her sleeping, her nursing, her walk time and playtime. I love taking her to see my 
parents, who have fallen in love with her too. She's brought so much to our whole family. 
It is impossible for a mother to express the profound love she has for her child. I love her 
with all my heart and could never give her away. I understand that Mrs. Donovan wants to have a 
child, but before June, she did not even know Sally existed. Richard and I have raised and cared 
for Sally since she was born. Sally is a member of our family.  
While Sally may not be biologically related to us, she is still our baby. Sally came from 
inside of me; she kicked in my belly and nurses from my breast. It is love and care that makes a 
mother, not genes. Mrs. Donovan doesn’t have the same bond with Sally that I do. She hasn’t 
raised Sally since birth.  A mistake made by the hospital should not allow the Donovans to take 
away our child. I beg that the Donovans reconsider their decision to sue for custody of Sally. 
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Appendix J 
Gchat Scripts from Studies 3a and 3b 
P1 = Fictional Participant 1 
P2 = Fictional Participant 2 
P3 = Participant  
Prosecution Script 
P1: okay so my experimenter just left and he told me to go first. I guess we are supposed 
to go through the questions one at a time and discuss them. Lets see, the first question is to talk 
about the strongest arguments in favor of our case. I think the fact that Kerry and her husband 
have a right to raise their biological child is a key point for our side. She shouldn’t have this right  
taken away. To live knowing that their child is out there somewhere being raised by other 
people…I can’t imagine how horrible that would be. What do you think? (participant 2 goes next 
right? Haha) 
P2: Yeah, I go now  I agree with those points. Also, I think it is important to consider 
how young Sally is and how this works in our favor. Sally probably isn’t making real memories 
yet, so having her live with our client and her husband wouldn’t be detrimental to her mental 
health. This kinda falls in line with your point about it being the parents right to raise their 
biological child…except it is also Sally’s right to grow up in her own family. Does that make 
sense? Oh, and on top of that, our client can’t get pregnant anymore and therefore this is her only 
chance to have a baby that is related to her, Can you think of any other ideas?  
P3: (they say what they think is the strongest argument) 
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P1: Yeah! That totally makes sense, I really like that idea. Lets see, the next question 
wants us to look at the weakest side of our case and how we would respond to an attack from the 
other team. I mean, I think we have a pretty strong case haha but I guess the defense could say 
that because their client gave birth to Sally and raised her that she is more of a ‘mom’ but I don’t 
think that is really true because their client has been with Sally for such a short period of time. 
For example a baby sitter can love a child and help raise the child but that doesn’t make her the 
mom, right? (done) 
P2: Hah that is a pretty good point about the baby sitter, actually. As for how to respond 
to the defense’s point, I personally believe that the argument you just mentioned (about her being 
more of a ‘mom’ because she gave birth / raised Sally for 5 months) is more of a plea for their 
client’s wellbeing than for Sally’s. Sally is just a baby and wouldn’t really be aware of what is 
happening or what all of this means, so the emotional struggle is honestly only something 
affecting the Washingtons. I do feel bad for the Washingtons and believe that they should be 
compensated by the hospital for the mistake, but that doesn't change the fact that our client is 
Sally's real mother. Thoughts?  
P3: (they respond) 
P1: For sure, that’s a great point! We are coming up with some great stuff  Lets see… 
the next question is about what the other side has as their strongest point and how we should 
attack it. I think the defense is likely to try to get sympathy by bringing up the fact their client 
has sacrificed a lot for the pregnancy, like giving up her job and dealing with health 
complications. They will try to pull at heartstrings. Do you agree? 
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P2: Yeah I agree, the other team is going to bring a lot of emotion to the table. However,  
we should respond by saying that although it is unfortunate that their client had to make 
sacrifices for Sally, it shouldn’t be a deciding factor in who gets to raise Sally.  Also, our client is 
very sympathetic too. Like what 1 mentioned earlier about how awful it would feel to know you 
have a child but you are prevented from raising it. The Donovans are fit and loving parents who 
want to care for their daughter who was unfairly taken from them. And also how unfair it is to 
Sally. How she would feel learning that her real parents were out there and had wanted to raise 
her, but were not allowed to. What are your thoughts 3? 
P3: (response) 
P1: So true, I definitely agree with all that has been said so far. Alright on to the last 
question, which is what the other side is weakest on and how we could attack it. I think it just 
comes down to the fact that while it is hard for the Washington’s to give up Sally, parents have a 
right to their biological children if they want to raise them. Our client never agreed to give up 
Sally. And also Sally’s wellbeing matters too! If she can live with her biological parents, then 
she should do so (providing the transition will not cause damage, which in this case it won’t 
because she is so young). What else? 
P2: Right. We could also add that if Sally does stay with the Washington’s she will 
basically be living a lie or would be in for a pretty big surprise if the parents do tell her why she 
isn’t related to them. No kid deserves that kind of identity crisis right? (done) 
P3: (response)  
P1: yup :D hah should we get our experimenters? Or is there anything else you think we 
need to discuss?   
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P2: I think we are good, right? This was fun haha, it was nice talking to all of you! Until 
next week  
P1: We are gonna kick butt! The other side doesn’t have a chance   
P2: Totally haha. Adios!  
Defense Script 
P1: okay so my experimenter just left and he told me to go first. I guess we are supposed 
to go through the questions one at a time and discuss them. Lets see, the first question is to talk 
about the strongest arguments in favor of our case. I think the whole idea of motherhood being 
about love vs genes is a big one. When people adopt they are considered the real parents because 
they are the ones who put time and love into raising the child, right? What do you think? 
(participant 2 goes next right? Haha) 
P2: Yeah I go now . I agree with those points. Also it just feels so wrong for our clients 
to have to give up their child. I think that the bond they have with Sally is stronger than the one 
the Donovans claim to have. I mean Janet carried the baby for nine months and then raised her 
for five more months; that creates a powerful bond. Think of how bonded parents are with their 
kids by that point? It would be so wrong for her to lose the child now. Also, our client had to 
give up so much for the pregnancy, that should count for something don’t you think? 
P3: (they say what they think is the strongest argument) 
P1: Yeah! That totally makes sense, I really like that idea. The next question wants us to 
look at the weakest side of our case and how we would respond to an attack from the other team. 
I mean, I think we have a pretty strong case haha. I guess the prosecution could still say that it 
shouldn’t make a difference if Sally moves in with the Donovans because she has been with the 
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Washingtons for such a short period of time. That is really the only thing that sticks out to me. 
Do you have any other ideas? 
P2: Yeah very true, the prosecution will probably argue that if Sally were like 6 or 
something she would have a stronger bond with our clients and so taking her away would be 
psychologically and emotionally damaging to her. But since she is so little there wouldn’t be a 
big impact. As for how to respond to this, I personally believe that this argument is really just an 
additional reason that it could be worse to take the child away under other circumstances; it 
doesn't change what's right in this case. I think the point is that our clients are still the rightful 
parents; they would be devastated to lose their child. So even if Sally would be ‘okay’ if she 
moved, that doesn't mean it's right to take her away. Make sense? what do you think?  
P3: (they respond) 
P1: For sure, I definitely agree and think they will bring those things up. We are coming 
up with some great stuff  I think we can move on to the next question now, which is about 
what the other side has as their strongest point and how we should attack it. I think the 
prosecution is likely to try to get sympathy by bringing up the fact that their client can not get 
pregnant anymore and that Sally is her only hope of having a child that is related to her. Our 
client can technically have another baby, but their client can’t. Do you agree?  
P2: Yeah I definitely agree. I understand how that must be hard for their client but that 
doesn’t necessarily give her the right to take away Sally from the woman who gave birth to her 
and raised her. Mrs. Donovan can always adopt. It isn’t as though she can never raise a child. 
What do you think? 
P3: (response) 
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P1: So true, I definitely agree with all that has been said so far. Alright, on to the last 
question, which is what the other side is weakest on and how we could attack it. I think it just 
comes down to the fact that our client gave birth to Sally and raised her for all this time and that 
makes her more of a ‘mom’ than the prosecution’s client, right? I don’t really know how else to 
say it. 
P2: Right and also it just seems so inhuman to take a child away from their family! Both 
of our clients have probably connected so strongly with Sally by now—and she to them. Sally 
may be young, but I do believe that a deep bond has been formed between her and our clients. 
The Washingtons had to wake up at all hours to feed her, introducing her to their family, taking 
her to the doctor, all that stuff creates a bond that the Donovans do not have with Sally. I mean, I 
really do feel bad for the other woman but our family should win this case, no question. What do 
you think? 
P3: (response) 
P1: yup :D hah should we get our experimenters? Or is there anything else you think we 
need to discuss?   
P2: I think we are good, right? This was fun haha, it was nice talking to all of you! Until 
next week  
P1: We are gonna kick butt! The other side doesn’t have a chance   
P2: Totally haha. Adios!  
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Appendix K 
 Unpleasant Task from Studies 3a and 3b 
Pattern Recognition Task 
Instructions: For each stream of letters, find one four-letter animal word, circle the letters, and 
write the word you find in each line.  
Rules: 
 The letters do not have to be next to each other, but the word will read from left to right. 
 You can find the same words more than once.  
Example:   
 Answer: 
    I M B W H Z W E M J T O M X V P W Q A M B Z Y S M R D D V Bear 
Practice 
I. J X K P F C Z S J H O S R Y M R W J E Q X U V N A B E N P  
II. X G Q Q Z T D I L B I K G O G S P B U D G M I C J R G N K 
III. E B F C M R T P E L L Y Z T M C C W T O A G L E M K S W Z 
Words:  
 Bear 
 Bird 
 Crow 
 Deer 
 Duck 
 Frog 
 Goat         
 Hawk 
 Lion  
 Seal         
 Slug 
 Swan 
 Tick 
 Wolf 
 Worm
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1. V G C P T Y T Q Q R L O B B E Q Y K X A T W C Y H W R Y L  
 
2. F Z U S N I B S D T L L U M L W C X I A Q Q F E C A J K R  
 
3. N D K Y Y J M R L Y S Z K S U A I I C J L O F K M A W N X  
 
4. O Y D R L I B A X O E N F F S T G H E Q R C E M C F P D N  
 
5. T P J J Y F K D T Z Y C Z X G G S S N T K R P G B O R W B  
 
6. R Z W L B E L K T Z V D C N P A V T E S J N V Z I O N I G  
 
7. C B U J F E K A B L K Z Q R C V O A W U H O T C L D D F T  
 
8. L J S G K L P D Q F F W Z Y V S B E N U B G S F A K I R I  
 
9. V J S X U O A W E F C J I P I T B F L R V R A M R N S L E  
 
10. L R C C W B E B L E R P E H P I O G R T D E D P Q A P R C  
 
11. D B P W J B A S T K T J M P E J A K U O L P C E U D G R P  
 
12. K H J D W E S E W O W U S K A T Y M S O Z E Y P Z D O R V  
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[Continues with new problems for another 10 pages, reaching 132 total.]  
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Appendix L 
Questionnaire From Studies 3a and 3b 
 
General Questionnaire 
 
What is your year of birth? _____________________ 
What is your sex?  
  Male  Female Other/prefer not to say 
What is your race/ethnicity? 
 White/Caucasian African American Hispanic       Asian American  
 Native American  Other___________      Prefer not to say  
Please check all that apply: 
 ___I am a Harvard Undergraduate 
 ___I am an Undergraduate at a University other than Harvard 
 ___I am a Harvard Summer School Student 
How well do you speak English (click one)?  
 ___I am a native English speaker 
 ___I am not a native English speaker, but I speak English fluently 
 ___I am highly proficient in English (I occasionally make minor errors, but 
 comprehend everything I hear/read) 
 ___I am moderately proficient in English (I occasionally have trouble 
 understanding something/being understood)  
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Please take a moment to carefully read through and fill out this short questionnaire  
 
1. How invested are you in winning the case?  
 
1                 2                 3                 4                 5                 6                 7  
           Not at all              Extremely 
 
2. To what degree do you believe that the side you argued for today actually has 
the more valid case?  
 
1                 2                 3                 4                 5                 6                 7  
           Not at all         Very strongly 
 
3. How much did you like your teammates today?  
 
1                 2                 3                 4                 5                 6                 7  
           Not at all              Extremely 
 
4. How connected did you feel to your teammates today?  
 
1                 2                 3                 4                 5                 6                 7  
           Not at all              Extremely 
 
5. How happy are you about being on the prosecution/defense when you come 
back next week? 
 
1                 2                 3                 4                 5                 6                 7  
           Not at all              Extremely 
 
6. How confident do you feel that your side will win next week?  
 
1                 2                 3                 4                 5                 6                 7  
           Not at all              Extremely 
 
7. How excited are you about returning next week to debate against the other 
team? 
 
1                 2                 3                 4                 5                 6                 7  
           Not at all              Extremely 
 
8. How competitive do you feel with the other team? 
 
1                 2                 3                 4                 5                 6                 7  
           Not at all              Extremely 
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How connected do you feel to yourself a week from now? 
 
1                 2                 3                 4                 5                 6                 7  
           Not at all              Extremely 
 
How similar do you feel to yourself a week from now? 
 
1                 2                 3                 4                 5                 6                 7  
           Not at all              Extremely 
 
How much do you like yourself a week from now? 
 
1                 2                 3                 4                 5                 6                 7  
           Not at all              Extremely 
 
9. How much did you enjoy the pattern task? 
 
1                 2                 3                 4                 5                 6                 7  
           Not at all              Very much 
 
10. How often did you want to stop while completing the pattern task? 
 
1                 2                 3                 4                 5                 6                 7  
           Not at all              Very often  
 
11. How much time do you think it took you to fill out the pattern task? 
 
__________________________ minutes 
 
12. How much time do you think it will take to finish the task when you return 
next week? 
 
__________________________ minutes 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
